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ROBERT MUGABE WAY

A GATHERING STORM

**Zimbabwe's
final hope
for reform?**



Mugabe is a crook.

**MDC-T leader Morgan Tsvangirai
in November 2010¹**

Please see reference notes on page 33

Foreword

The formation in early 2009 of a coalition government including the major political parties and the halt to years of hyperinflation by the introduction of foreign currency as legal tender created breathing space for all Zimbabweans. Individuals, companies and Government began rebuilding their livelihood, their businesses and service provision. Political parties and civil society organisations could start rebuilding too and utilise the new dispensation for asserting influence.

In November 2009 Action Aid Denmark published a report on the consequences and opportunities arising from this reconstruction. It took its title **Breathing Space** from the fact that a large number of individuals interviewed described the new dispensation as having provided them with a much-needed breathing space.

The report noted that

'in every society experiencing rapid transformation, reformers and conservatives are battling hard for control. In the present Zimbabwean interim, both groups are presently able to breathe and gather strength. It is too early to assess which of these opposing camps are able to force a contraction on the other parts' ability to draw strength from the interim'.

In concluding this year's report, such an assessment is however imperative. The picture is yet muddy and pregnant with uncertainty and ambiguities, **but there is a general consensus amongst citizens, political actors, international bodies and observers that reformers have been seen lacking in initiative and results - and that conservatives in many respects seems to have best utilised the breathing space for gathering renewed strength.**

Last year's report also noted, that

'per definition, a breathing space is an interim ... There is a tacit suggestion in the term that after the break, space will once again diminish, shrink, close in. This, too, is a feeling many Zimbabweans share - with trepidation'.

One year later, as this report is being prepared, the breathing space seems to be seriously contracting. There is a sense of a looming showdown of potentially devastating proportions. And as the Report's title indicates, trepidation is growing.

A certain economic stability has been achieved, enabling shops to provide basics and expand their reach. In rural areas, dollarisation has increased possibilities for gaining from fair rains, though severe bottlenecks in transport and marketing is holding back development.

As the Inclusive Government is heading for completion of its first two years, political instability is hampering real economic recovery nationwide. Attempts by reformers to advance the re-introduction of the rule of law, including a reduction of political oppression, and the rebuilding of State Institutions have largely been inconclusive and gains appears fragile.

During the latter part of 2010, relations between the principals in the coalition government appear to have deteriorated to such a degree that cooperation on reforms, notable such that will pave the way for free and fair elections, seems to be threatened.

Civil society has largely been unable to utilise the opening to advance their reformist agenda and seem to be somewhat demoralised by the lack of progress.

International assistance, notably from the region, will be crucial to assist Zimbabwe in its way forward, not least assuring that the political impasse that has divided and scarred the country for too long, will be freely and fairly resolved at the impending elections.

This report is being prepared in the run up to a meeting of key international donors and a parallel meeting of civil society organisations in Europe and representatives from Zimbabwe.

It aims at informing the debate at these meetings and suggests a number of recommendations for the stakeholders in those meetings.

25th November 2010

Frans Mikael Jansen

Secretary General
ActionAid Denmark

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The most we can do is meet and discuss, despite these big fears for violence because our hands are tied.

Chipfunde-Vava, convener of 50 Civil Society Organisations' deliberations on how to ensure free and fair elections.²

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” This is now a hard-knuckled
phase of Zimbabwean politics.
**George Charamba, spokesman for
President Robert Mugabe³**

1

OVERVIEW

A number of crucial reforms for the reconstruction of Zimbabwe is listed in the GPA. The parties agreed to:

- **build a society free of violence, fear, intimidation, hatred, patronage, corruption and founded on justice, fairness, openness, transparency, dignity and equality**
- **give priority to the restoration of economic stability and growth in Zimbabwe**
- **conduct a comprehensive, transparent and non-partisan land audit ... for the purpose of establishing accountability and eliminating multiple farm ownerships.**
- **create conditions for our people to write a constitution for themselves**
- **ensure equal treatment of all regardless of gender, race, ethnicity, place of origin and will work towards equal access to development for all**
- **create an environment of tolerance and respect among Zimbabweans and that all citizens are treated with dignity and decency irrespective of age, gender, race, ethnicity, place of origin or political affiliation**

And, in doing so,

- (a) respect and uphold the Constitution and other laws of the land;**
- (b) adhere to the principles of the Rule of Law.**

In this report these individual reforms are generally referred to as "the reforms" necessary to reconstruct Zimbabwe as a democratic country.

As Zimbabwe is heading for the conclusion of its second year under the Inclusive Government¹⁰, threats to reforms are mounting and a sense of dread for the expected upcoming elections is spreading.

Breathing space is still present in the economical sphere though it is narrow. With projected growth between 5,9% (IMF)¹¹ and 8,1% (MoF)¹² Zimbabwe is in 2010 experiencing real economic growth for the first time in 12 years. This is however from such a paltry base that most Zimbabweans only feel this as absence of decline. They do however vigorously appreciate the stability that dollarisation has brought to the economy, reducing inflation to a 'normal' rate of projected 4,5%, enabling farmers and businesses to plan and invest and shops to stock all necessary items.

Dollarisation has however meant that utilities and municipalities can no longer hide real costs in an artificially valued independent currency. Citizens have experienced dramatic real increases in their expenditure on rent, water, electricity, telephone, school fees, etc. On top of this unemployment in the formal sector remains high, estimated to be not below 85%, and as remittances from the country's substantial population of citizens residing overseas¹³ have likely diminished due to economic crisis there, the few who earn money support a growing part of their extended family. Economist JoÚ Robertson concludes that consequently, "even if prices are not rising very much, the cost of living is"¹⁴.

Politically, breathing space appears to have shrunk. Whereas the Zimbabwe Peace Project recorded a drop in politically motivated incidents of violence during 2009, down to app. "a normal" level of 5-600 incidents per month, 2010 has seen a continuous rise averaging about 800 incidents per month. These incidents have mainly taken place in rural and peri-urban areas, and are, according to ZPP, closely linked to the main political parties' attempts to dominate the consultative phase of the Constitution-Making Process.

The CMP serves well to illustrate Zanu-PF's adaptation to the new dispensation. Initially it sought to sabotage the process by creating havoc and violently intimidating participants in the First All-Stakeholder Conference in mid-July 2009. However, as the party realised that sabotaging the process would not carry it forward, it re-oriented its approach. Firstly, it gave up the idea of muscling through the controversial Kariba Draft¹⁵ as this was met with too much

resistance. Campaigning for what was seen as a Zanu-PF constitution gave too many reverberations of the 2000 referendum. Instead, it 'dissolved' the draft in distilling the positions most important to Zanu-PF and prepared for a nationwide campaign to have its supporters back these positions. It then delayed the process for almost half a year through confrontations on numerous questions of details, until its party machine had finalised the campaign preparations - and then went whole-heartedly into the process in order to dominate the views collected through the out-reach meetings.

Whereas Zanu-PF's support in and capacity to dominate rural areas, especially in the Manicaland and Mashonaland East, West and Central Provinces were demonstrated in the 2008-election to have diminished dramatically, and whereas internal Zanu-PF reports have documented the withering of party structures¹⁶, the outreach process provided an opportunity for the party to rally its structures, mainly rooted in its control of ward and district administration, to generally dominate the majority of the out-reach meetings. Zanu-PF seems confident that sufficiently popular support was recorded for its positions enabling it to have most of these represented in the new constitution as it is drafted during December-March.¹⁷

Through its campaign Zanu-PF seems to have scored a double victory by not only gathering support for its constitutional positions, but also by utilising the CMP to re-establish the party's influence in these rural constituencies.¹⁸ Violence and intimidation has often accompanied this and political space has concurrently been shrunk considerably for all political parties or positions other than Zanu-PF's. In addition, this ability on the part of Zanu-PF to utilise an issue hitherto regarded as lost for the party, deftly utilising it to create a base of strength, bears witness to Zanu-PF's often overpowering ability to strategic thinking and tactical action - and a similar lack of organisational strength in MDC.

In contrast to Zanu-PF's efficiently conducted campaign to dominate the out-reach meetings, neither MDC nor Civil Society Organisations seem to have made similar efforts to ensure popular backing for their positions. Some attempts have, true, been thwarted by local police, CIO or other strong-arm authorities linked to Zanu-PF, and the majority of the victims in the ZPP-reported incidents belong to these two groups. But this should not obscure the fact that neither MDC nor civil society have launched any attempt to seriously influence, let alone dominate, the process. The reason for this could be the groups' perception that they 'owned' the constitutional issue, having successfully campaigned since 1999 for constitutional changes. This lack of action must be regarded as a major tactical error on the side of both groups, perhaps most dramatically in consequence for the CSOs, for whom the Constitution-Making Process provided a golden opportunity to penetrate territories hitherto not or difficultly accessible to them. Should repression have been the main reason for CSOs not utilising the CMP to campaign in these areas for their constitutional positions, this too seems to have been a major tactical error in lost opportunities - after all, the President himself had repeatedly urged all Zimbabweans

to freely discuss these matters nationally. Any hindrance of such debate would have been a campaign platform in itself to widen political space and counter its narrowing.

As the Constitution-Making Process demonstrated Zanu-PF's ability to act offensively in rural areas, on the national and regional scene the party has continuously piled pressure on MDC-T in a relentless attempt to dominate its governing partner, and it has done this with considerable success. By failure to implement agreements, by outright breach of agreements, by unilateral actions, by divertive tactics, by skilful messaging within its blanket propaganda and by naked use of violence and intimidation, Zanu-PF has during the past year strengthened its position to one as 'The governing party within the coalition government', thus seeking to reduce Morgan Tsvangirai's MDC-T to that of a junior partner, even taunting it in the process¹⁹. As Zanu-PF has dominated the political agenda, MDC-T has displayed weaknesses in taking political initiatives and has been forced to continually react to Zanu-PF's diverse range of instruments of dominance rather than being pro-active.

This is not to say that MDC has not achieved successes, some of them even crucially needed and almost miraculously performed. MDC-controlled ministers have managed to greatly improve services in health and education, distributed 13 million textbooks to schools, halted deadly cholera epidemics, eliminated inflation and restored order to the economy. It is widely credited for having created the breathing space.

Events during 2010 did however seem to indicate that the party have underestimated the reality of power politics as the basis for everything else. Esteemed Harare analyst Eldred Masunungure describes the reform strategy as aiming for incremental democratisation in a contested equilibrium. He characterises the two parties' approach to this contest in the following way:

"Zanu-PF takes politics very seriously and it is vastly more interested in power politics than economic policy and service delivery. They understand power and they will look at every single item on the agenda solely from the point of view of power. They never act without a clear calculation of whether an initiative will consolidate, expand or threaten the power of Zanu-PF. They interpret everything in terms of power. MDC tends to look moralistically on power and politics. That might be fine in an ideal world, but in Zimbabwe you have to be suspicious towards everything coming from Zanu-PF, especially if you consider yourself an opposition party."

By concentrating on power politics and not letting itself be distracted by economics or service-delivery, Zanu-PF seems to have successfully contested this equilibrium to its own gain. Whether that too will halt the aim of incremental democratisation is yet to be seen.

1.1 DIAMONDS

Since the army in 2008 took control over the apparently lucrative and newly discovered diamonds fields in the



Eastern Highlands' Marange area and sealed off public scrutiny of the extent of the mineral wealth, speculation has been rife over who is benefiting from the proceeds of mainly the smuggling taking place from the area (as only little official export has been undertaken).

As expected, all key top Zanu-PF officials have been implicated in benefiting from this, from Mugabe and his wife downwards, but no definitive proof has been furnished. Three companies with more or less obscure background have been given licences to mine, all of them in partnership with the Government's Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe. In addition, the army has a concession to be operated in collaboration with a Chinese company, allegedly run by that country's army. It is unclear to which degree the state coffers are benefiting from its involvement in these ventures.

It is also unclear how much value is actually being mined in Marange and how much the Government will ultimately be able to benefit from even well regulated and transparent procedures. As always with diamonds in poor countries, rumours are rife and fantasies easily prevail. Contrary to widespread beliefs of the army accumulating a vast

"war chest" to be used during the forthcoming elections, Finance Minister Biti denies that this could possibly be the case.²⁰

Diamond sales from Zimbabwe are consequently highly controversial. The world body regulating diamond sales, the Kimberley Process, has authorised only two minor sales from the stockpile held in Zimbabwe. Voting in the body has been divided between European and American representatives in one camp, and Chinese, African and other Third World representatives in another. Intense lobbying is centred on this body as international rights groups push to have Zimbabwe excluded from trading its diamonds due to human rights violations in Marange²¹. The South African-born Kimberley Process Monitor, who is closely connected to ANC government circles, is repeatedly being accused by Zimbabwean CSOs as having been "bought" by Zanu-PF to recommend sales. These accusations were reinforced as a local human rights activist, Farai Maguwu was arrested, after the monitor told police that he had received documents from Maguwu implying breaches of human rights in Marange. Several European and American banks have decided not to finance companies' trade in Zimbabwean diamonds. The World Diamond Council has advised

its cutting and trading company member not to deal with Zimbabwean diamonds before the Kimberley Process has taken a final stand on the issue.

1.2. OCTOBER 7

Tsvangirai had decided in 2008 to put aside his personal and political differences with Mugabe and work together with him to secure the success of the IG. After a number of meetings, the two started warming to each other, boasting in public their working relationship was now cordial. Tsvangirai went all over the world defending Mugabe and reminding everyone he was a liberation struggle hero whose legacy could still be rescued. In all possible venues he appeared to go very far to establish a working relationship with Mugabe. Increasingly as political results appeared to be lacking, a growing number of critics in his party and in the population felt he had gone too far. Simultaneously, opinion polls showed a growing trend in falling voter support for MDC.²²

In early October, MDC-T appears to have changed tactics. The trigger was once again the outstanding issues, mainly the appointment of provincial governors. Months earlier, the parties had agreed to divide the posts after a 5:4:1 formula, with Tsvangirai's party getting the largest number of posts, followed by Zanu-PF and MDC-M. Mugabe had however never executed the agreement. Tsvangirai then patiently waited for the governor's term to expire by July 31st. Still nothing happened, as the issue became part of the wider disagreements on 'outstanding' issues. The formula was once again confirmed as an agreement during the Windhoek SADC summit in August, where a 30-day deadline was agreed by all parties for implementing a wide range of outstanding issues, including the appointment of governors. The deadline came and went without implementation of any of the agreed points. As Robert Mugabe on the Principals' Monday meeting October 4 informed his two colleagues, that he had re-appointed all 10 Zanu-PF governors and that he had no intention of ever swearing in MDC-T treasurer Roy Bennett as deputy agriculture minister, Tsvangirai was stunned and furious.

On Thursday, October 7, in a rare aggressive statement, Tsvangirai viscously lashed out against Mugabe. In detail he described his feelings of "betrayal" by Mugabe, even referring to Mugabe and his loyalists as his "yester enemies and tormentors", revealing his bitterness. He denounced the appointments and launched a raft of initiatives. Referring to the GPA's inclusion in the constitution and its articles binding the President to consult him on any major appointments, he denounced Mugabe's "unconstitutional" initiatives. He consequently wrote to a number of states urging them not to recognise a number of Mugabe-appointed ambassadors and vowing that his party would not accept any dealings with the unconstitutionally appointed governors.

Since then, MDC-T seems to have shifted tactics to a more assertive stance. Nothing came of the campaign against the ambassadors as the recipient states (and the UN) had long accepted most of them²³. The issue of the governors is however more contentious, as they are

members of Parliaments' upper house, the Senate and as such crucial to Zanu-PF's overall Parliamentary majority. *However, a working Senate is crucial too for MDC's reform bills, notably the revisions of law-and-order and media bills and election reforms.*

There are signs that MDC-T in its actions managed to unnerve Zanu-PF. As the Senate convened a few days later, all Governors were conspicuously absent. And five days later, Mugabe reacted by claiming the GPA would end by February 2011 and demanding elections no later than June 2011.

With only nine months to go and an excruciatingly slow Constitution-Making Process limping towards its optimistically planned referendum scheduled for late June 2011, Mugabe's move immediately offset panicky reactions. In the general population this was fuelled by memories of the widespread violence, looting and intimidation that accompanied the second round of presidential elections in 2008. In the business community it was sparked by fears of companies' fragile recovery being threatened by months of disturbances, arson and lawlessness. And in the political community by the realisation that most reforms needed to ensure a free and fair election had not yet been undertaken. The dreaded Public Order and Security Act, the draconian media regulation Access to Information and Public Protection Act and the Broadcasting Services Act (retrenching Zanu-PF's control over the airwaves) are still fully in force - no meaningful media reform has been undertaken, just as the voters' roll is still in dire shambles with thousands of ghost voters registered - and even further hundreds of thousands of voters omitted from the list.

Once again, judgement falls hard on MDC-T for this lack of reformist pace. Since March 2008 MDC has enjoyed a majority vote in the Parliament, yet the party has been lethargic in utilising this for passing crucially needed reforms. In addition, as the MDC agreed to a model for the Constitution-Making Process whereby every MP would be heading an out-reach team - and earning attractive per diems - Parliament was rendered inactive for almost half of the legislative year of 2010, from June to mid-November 2010. It is true that bills are traditionally prepared in the relevant ministries, and all the above Acts are in the custody of Zanu-PF Minister, who do not seem to hurry in tabling their political opponent's bill. But the Constitution allows MPs to table private bills - which MDC-T has utilised in their reform bill of POSA. In spite of its regular talk of forthcoming elections, the MDC have displayed an outstanding patience in preparing for these, not least the necessary reforms creating what ANC during the 1990's transitional phase in South Africa termed "a level playing ground" for the forthcoming electoral contest.

1.3 ENDGAME

As last year's report indicated, one of the country's opposing camps would eventually be able to force a contraction on the other parts' ability to draw strength from the breathing space.

As perception of Zanu-PF having gained upper hand in this, the impending showdown is increasingly instilling fear, resulting in resignation and trepidation amongst Zimbabweans. It is as if President Mugabe has the capability to mesmerize; as he has said he will have elections, a substantial part of society react as if they take for granted that it will be so.

Faced with this, Tsvangirai flanked by the MDC-T leadership in October went on a nationwide tour to invigorate party faithful and citizens alike. "I can assure you there will be no violence because we will use all our powers nationally, regionally and internationally to have a credible election," he soothed the audience.²⁴

Will such rhetoric persuade a voter population, hitherto regularly cowed by threats and violence to yet participate, campaign and vote in the coming elections?

It possibly might. Many observers, mainly foreign, have decried Zimbabweans' lack of lust for confrontation with the forces of the regime. They obviously underestimate Zanu-PF's longstanding reputation for ruthlessness ("we have degrees in violence," as president Robert Mugabe reminded everybody a decade ago). They also overlook that fact that Africans all over the continent might be displaying inertia in voting or speaking out against their African rulers - but experience also shows that once they have made this move, they show equal inertia in retracting their positions. African voters are generally far more loyal to their chosen party than European or American voters. All signs are that the MDC-T can win a solid majority in any election - given they are free and fear. Research from Zimbabwe's leading political polling agency, the Mass Public Opinion Institute, MPOI, have during the past 18 months recorded a consistent lead by MDC-T over all other political rivals, though the lead over Zanu-PF is narrowing.

Consequently, the question is not whether MDC-T can win an election, but whether it will be *allowed* to. Or rather, given the fact that MDC-T from years of experience is expecting its opponents to deny it their victory, whether MDC-T *will manage* to win, including manage a transfer of power.

Such management requires resources, skills and not least bold initiatives on a range of fields, from self-defence measures at village and community level, over a raft of much-needed reform initiatives long neglected, to proactive politicking to build and link solid local, regional and international alliances - also a long un-successful activity, especially regarding MDC-T's immediate neighbours in South Africa, Mozambique, Zambia, Namibia and Angola.

History shows that SADC is a reluctant partner in the process as most of its leaders preferring not to get embroiled in Zimbabwe's contest. All of SADC's prominent presidents

are heads of liberation movements, most of them facing challengers demanding good governance. The longevity and gravity of the Zimbabwean crisis has forced them into dealing with MDC, applauded by donors, but this has not made them less reluctant to recognise the movement. They could have a strategic interest in not assisting MDC to victory - this might strengthen their challengers at home.

As the contest is sharpening, leading Zanu-PF officials have become bolder in asserting that MDC-T has no hope of winning. In line with the above quote from Stanley Mudge, Zanu-PF national chairman Simon Khaya Moyo in a late October message obviously also targeted for the ruling (liberation parties) in neighbouring states stated that

*"No liberation movement will ever be replaced by people coming from nowhere"*²⁵.

Equally powerful Presidential Affairs Minister Didymus Mutasa, a key Central Committee member, in September repeated a party vow never to hand over power to anybody outside their own circle:

*ZANU PF will never hand over power to MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai, even if he wins next year's elections. He will never rule this country. Never ever.... If we go to the polls and he defeats Mugabe, ZANU PF and the people of Zimbabwe will not allow that.*²⁶



Foto: The Harden

2

ECONOMY

2.1. IMPROVEMENTS - BUT ZIMBABWE IS NOW MAINLY EXPORTING UNPROCESSED MINERALS

In Zimbabwe, any evaluation of the economy is invariably held up against the decline experienced since app. 2000, culminating in 2008/09. That year, massive amounts of Zimbabwe dollars were printed in preparation for the presidential run-off elections in June 2008 and used to pay supporters of Zanu-PF. Later in the year, inflation soared to 89,700,000,000,000,000,000,000 per cent as 1 US\$ fetched Z\$10-trillion²⁷. It is a widely held view that Zanu-PF was forced not only by SADC pressure to accept the GPA, but also by the prospect of an impending meltdown of the economy. It should be noted that all top Zanu-PF officials themselves are business operators, and though the party as such will give preference to power politics over economic policy, individual party chiefs have to consider their personal interests, too. As this year capped a decade-long contraction with no less than 14,4 per cent negative growth, all businesses in Zimbabwe except the most politically linked were hurt.

2009 began with Z\$ inflation running at 10.000 per cent, i.e. adding 24 zeros per year. Mid-January saw the introduction of a trillion dollar note (12 zeroes) and 100% inflation in a day. A couple of weeks later the Z\$ was finally abandoned and the multi-currency system popularly known as dollarisation introduced. For the remainder of the first half of 2009, Zimbabweans generally saw prizes steadily falling, and calculations show that real value of wages doubled in 2009. Alas, only few people had wages as the vast majority of the formal work force was now unemployed. Prices started rising again in the latter half of 2009 and by mid 2010, some of the real wage increase had been lost to renewed inflation, though real wages were still double of that in January 2009²⁸.

The extent of the burdens placed on the few people in formal employment is evident in numbers published by OCHA at the time of dollarisation: Out of the country's 12 million people, only 480 000 had formal jobs, down 87 per cent from 3,6 million only five years earlier, in 2003. Employment has since risen, but only marginally²⁹. Civil servants

constitute the majority of formally employed and wages are paltry, teachers and nurses earning US\$ 130-175 per month - some however being given bonuses on top of US\$ 50-150 per month. The Zimbabwean Poverty Datum Line for a family is estimated at US\$ 500 per month.³⁰

Remittances from relatives overseas have played an important role in Zimbabweans' survival strategies over the past years and continue to do so. The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) estimates that app. US\$ 700 million was transferred as remittances to Zimbabwe in 2009. This exceeded Government's entire wage bill (US\$ 517 million)³¹. One could however assume that the flow of remittances slowed in 2010 due to the global economic crisis.

In September 2010 Finance Minister Tendai Biti revised upwards growth figures for the year to 8,1 per cent. Both IMF and the Economist Intelligence Unit find this too optimistic, giving figures of 5,1 and 4,1.³² Counting in inflation and a real population growth of zero (perhaps negative due to emigration), mainly due to AIDS, the result is real growth per capita. At the basis of this growth is a staggering 83 per cent surge in exports during first half of 2010³³ based on minerals and a bumper tobacco crop.

Exported minerals are mainly platinum (Zimbabwe holding the world's second-largest deposits after South Africa), ferrochrome and gold. Mining now accounts for almost 70 per cent of exports. Sadly, this reflects the deterioration of the Zimbabwean economy, as refined agricultural products (mainly first-grade tobacco), which requires much less foreign capital input and employs a dramatically higher number of people than mining, used to dominate exports. This trend is likely set to continue as global commodity pricing are once again rising and both Zimbabwe's manufacturing or farming sectors (previously its major source of employment) continue faltering.

In recent years it was discovered that Zimbabwe has been gifted with very large deposits of diamonds of good quality. Prior to a massive find in the Eastern Highlands' Marange

area in 2006, diamond production in Zimbabwe was mainly limited to accidental finds in alluvial gold diggings, with the exception of a small mine near the South African border. Chaos and controversy has reigned over this sector ever since, as first the police moved in to control rival syndicates of diggers and smugglers in Marange and then, in late 2008, the army took control. Zimbabwe has had difficulties exporting its diamonds under the international controlling body known as the Kimberley Process due to continued allegations of human rights violations, as well as legal and procedural irregularities concerning exploitation rights of the Marange fields.

The Government estimates an area of 77.000³⁴- 125.000³⁵ hectares around Marange is pregnant with diamonds. Zimbabwean newspapers reported in October of additional diamond finds in Binga, Masvingo and Tsholotso³⁶. Zimbabwe is presently sitting on between five and six million carats that it could not sell during its suspension from the Kimberley process.³⁷ One public sale and another conducted behind closed doors during 2010 have only

contributed marginally to the public coffers. The Kimberley Process only applies to uncut diamonds, and Zanu-PF in the guise of government is searching for partners to establish local polishing and cutting facilities; so far 12 licences have been issued at a cost each of US\$ 20,000.³⁸

Zimbabwe was at independence Africa's second-most industrialised country. The sector was much diversified, including engineering, textiles and clothing, pharmaceuticals, furniture, food processing and much else. Until the commercial agricultural sector was virtually destroyed, manufacturing was the second largest employer of labour. As the economy declined, production fell in 2008 to only 8% of productive capacity. Dollarisation saw this rise in 2009 to almost 40%. Sadly, the upturn was short-lived, and currently the sector is exceptionally fragile and decimated and most production capacity is lying idle, rusting away.

Most critical in all economic sectors is the acute lack of working capital as Zimbabwe is extremely illiquid. The economy has shrunk to such a degree that neither



Foto: Tine Harden

the stock exchange nor local banks are able to provide working capital. Most of the populace is still reluctant to deposit money in banks, partly as they fear for the security of their funds, partly because of high service fees charged by banks (most banks charge a monthly fee of app. \$ 10 for each account plus stiff fees for each transaction). The international money market is weary of lending to or invest in Zimbabwe. What little money is available is subject to very high interest rates. Relief from a special World Bank allocation is from November being allocated to banks for commercial loans; finance minister Biti expect that this input will lift industry utilisation to 40% in 2011.³⁹

A revival remains fragile for a host of economic reasons: Diminished consumer buying power, extremely erratic electricity supply, intermittent telephonic and telecommunication services, uncertainty in rail and air services all contribute.

Lack of political stability and of guarantees for the rule of law are major impediments to foreign direct investments. Gazetted indigenisation regulations, whereby all companies with a capital exceeding US\$ 500,000 must have local black ownership of at least 51 per cent, have further deterred investors.

Foreign direct investment is consequently trickling in sparingly, except from China, which is investing heavily in capital-intensive mining from which very little trickle-down is felt.

2.2. RURAL REALITIES

Two competing trends seems to dominate economic conditions in rural areas, where an estimated half of the majority of Zimbabwe's population live and work. Firstly, in sharp contrast to urban life, dollarisation has in itself not changed life very much. Contrary to conventional thinking dollarisation in itself is not disadvantageous to the small-scale farming community ("they do not have access to foreign currency") - the notion of elusive 'foreign currency' is false as all currency in Zimbabwe is foreign. Peasant farmers' livelihood is equally now as before shaped by their capability to produce - and market - any surplus production above their own needs.

The 2010 harvest produced a fairly good crop, albeit with "the usual" regional variations whereby the sandy and drier low-lying lands to the south, west and north suffered below average harvests. Constraints to increased production were mainly lack of fertilizer, and more importantly, the breakdown of the country's transport facilities have seriously impeded farmers' ability to acquire needed inputs and hampered farmers with surplus production to bring this to market and thereby acquire cash.

Consequently, cash is still a very scarce commodity in rural areas. Bartering is widespread. Once again, contrary to conventional thinking, this might not necessarily be to the disadvantage of farmers. A study undertaken by Concern calculated that at the basis of the barter exchange were fair prices for goods 'sold' and goods/services received. In addition, the study found that farmers were not necessarily

forced to barter but often preferred storing food for barter rather than selling this and 'storing' the money in banks.

Humanitarian needs have diminished since the reforms were initiated; agencies will provide food aid to close to 1,3 million people in 2011. It should be noted that this figure and the practice of distributing food aid, including agricultural inputs, is highly political: Local authorities, traditionally controlled by Zanu-PF, wish to be seen as providing food to their subjects; food aid has long been extremely politicised in Zimbabwe. In addition, a number of NGO's are also perceived as being in favour of remaining 'in business' of procuring and distributing food aid.

Secondly, there is a notable exception to the cash crunch in tobacco farming. 2009 saw a huge number of small-scale farmers moving into tobacco-growing (numbering 51.000, up from 30.000 in the immediately preceding years⁴⁰) and as this coincided with very favourable weather conditions plus initial above-normal prices, some 50.000 families consequently have had a felt inflow of cash. For the 2010/2011 season an even larger number of small-scale farmers are planting tobacco.

In addition, rising global prices for cotton, another cash crop for which Zimbabwe is known to produce high-quality harvests, have spurred international and local contractors to sign up thousands of farmers. As tobacco farming is restricted to the provinces with heavy soil and good rain patterns, i.e. Manicaland and the three Mashonaland provinces, cotton is grown in lighter soils, and the trend is consequently that the areas receiving cash income is likely to expand.

Meteorological forecasts for the 2010/11 season predict yet another above normal harvest. As the country this time has sufficient supplies of seeds and fertilizer, and as donors, especially NGO's, have had ample time to implement a system of widespread distribution, next year might just see a significant improvement of livelihoods in the rural areas.

The county does however not yet appear to produce enough foods to avert continued imports. This is especially true regarding wheat, where production is projected to have plunged in 2010 to an all-time low of 8,000 tonnes, far short of annual consumption of 250.000 tonnes. In contrast to maize wheat is a second, winter crop dependent of irrigation. Farmers are citing electricity shortages impeding irrigation plus a massive loss of combine harvesters to theft⁴¹ as chief reasons. In addition, the expected harvest is likely to be of poor quality due to the lack of combine harvesters. At its peak, Zimbabwe produced 365,000 tonnes of wheat annually.⁴²

3

KEY POLITICAL ACTORS AND STRATEGIES

3.1. ZANU-PF: DETERMINED, POWERFUL AND VULNERABLE

The party's strength lies in its control over all important levers on society: The security apparatus, including the police, the armed forces, the intelligence organisations, the attorney generals, the courts and the jails - and the civil service. The latter has a profound effect, even on MDC's ability to execute its coveted service delivery: Zanu-PF has appointed from its ranks every permanent secretary, most of the staff in the ministries, all governors, district and ward administrators etc. The same applies to all independent commissions. At all levels, instructions from the party will override any other order.

Zanu-PF is aware of its poor voter backing but has presently no intention of transferring any meaningful power to MDC, neither fully in an election nor partially in the IG. It is utilising its tactical strength, its organisational force and its hold on the key state and security levers to deny MDC any such transfer, regardless of provisions in the GPA.

The party is ultimately weakened by SADC's decision to force it into the IG thereby implying that Mugabe is not a fully legitimate president in spite of him having "won" the June 2008-elections. Conscious of the fact that it will have to seek legitimacy by winning the next elections, it is rebuilding its ability to be seen to win this legitimately and to deny MDC the same opportunity.

It applies five key tactics:

1. Diverting MDC-T attention and energies by keeping it occupied with other issues, such as defending MP's, ministers and allies in court against criminal charges; endless negotiations on petty issues pertaining to implementation of GPA details; service delivery to the populace; soothing foreign investors and governments important to MDC's promise to deliver improved livelihoods to its voters.
2. Frustrating MDC-T in the hope that it will withdraw from the IG.
3. Reasserting its control over rural constituencies, notably Manicaland province and the etÚic shona

heartland in the three Mashonaland provinces, often by violent or intimidating means.

4. Courting specific target groups, notably churches, lately also the urban youth to gain voters. For several years the party has embarked on a veritable campaign for it to 1) have allies gaining control over established churches - this has led to a vicious struggle for power within the Anglican Church and a less overt one within the Catholic church as Zanu-PF allied individuals have ousted or sidelined leaders perceived not to support the party, and 2) courting the vast amount of apostolic congregations. They are likely the single largest group of worshippers; they are generally advocating very conservative and authoritarian views; they are attracting the poorest and least educated masses. During 2010 the party embarked on a campaign to attract similarly less educated parts of the urban youth, using its Government mechanisms to bring in international pop stars, producing popular TV-shows and lately by enrolling into its campaign the country's popular representative in the TV-reality show Big Brother Africa.
5. The party is extending its patronage system to MDC members elected to public office, notably town and rural council members, corruption them by typically diverting public building plots and land to them.

In executing these strategies, Zanu-PF has to strike several delicate balances:

- Zanu-PF needs time to rebuild its power base in the country and to corrupt MDC officials in order to reduce that party's voter attraction. However, the longer time the GPA is running, the better MDC ministers will assert their will over the civil service and the more reforms they might succeed in pushing through - most importantly mechanisms to ensure free and fair elections. In this race against the clock for Zanu-PF, several factors complicate its position: The president's age and deteriorating health⁴³, the growing factional divisions in the party, Zanu-PF officials' reluctance to relinquish their lucrative posts for an uncertain future after elections, the party's reduced ability to extend patronage under dollarisation and Biti's control over public finances and - perhaps - a

growing willingness amongst the people to challenge Zanu-PF's authority as they see leading members of MDC being able to do so.

- In prolonging the implementation of the GPA or in outright breaching it, the party is keen to avoid provoking SADC into taking action against it. Zanu-PF has a long-standing positive relationship with leading SADC member and is keen to retain this useful tool in dealing with MDC-T. It consequently has probed how far it can go without inviting a SADC reaction. During the past 20 months it has incrementally increased its provocations towards MDC-T as SADC failed to react to the previous ones. Zanu-PF has not as yet reached the level of provocations towards MDC-T whereby SADC has reacted. Latest it reneged on its obligation to share the posts of provincial governors before sanctions are lifted, only two weeks after confirming such an agreement to the SADC summit in Windhoek. As this once again did not lead to any reaction from SADC, Mugabe boldly increased his provocations towards MDC-T by unilaterally appointing the governors and confirming that he had no intention of ever fulfilling his obligation to swear in MDC-T treasurer Roy Bennett as Deputy Agricultural Minister. Still more dramatic punishments of MDC-T might be expected as elections draw closer, and as Zanu-PF continues to seek the limit - as it always has the option of retracting its actions if SADC finally raps its fingers. In addition, Mugabe ultimately has the option of telling SADC "to go to Hell", as is his habitual dismissal of Western countries and institutions. He is conscious that he has the backing of the African Union and he and the party is skilfully maintaining and expanding their status as African liberators. He might however get to learn of a crucial limit for SADC-leaders' patience, which, if transgressed by Zanu-PF, will embarrass them to such a degree, that they enter into actions that could run contrary to Zanu-PF's immediate interests.

In spite of its appearance of a galvanized monolith, Zanu-PF is wracked by internal divisions. Two main camps are battling for control of party structures and national wealth, both with their long-term sights on winning the looming succession battle of replacing the 86-year old leader. Divisions amongst the two camps run along a diversity of fault lines in Zimbabwe's etUic, regional, commercial and political landscape.⁴⁴ In general, one camp around vice-president Joyce Mujuru (and her husband, prominent liberation war veteran and former supreme armed forces commander, Solomon Mujuru) control most of the remaining grass-root support in the dominant Shona etUic group. The other camp centres around the apparently equally influential Minister of Defence, Emmerson Mnangagwa. His allies control most of the state bureaucracy and is asserting influence over the Karanga group in mainly the Midlands and Masvingo provinces. Both have allies in the armed forces, though Solomon Mujuru's powerful successor, Defence Forces Commander General Constantine Chiwenga is believed to be backing Mnangagwa.

Mugabe has skilfully played off these factions against each other in order to maintain his grip on the divided party and

in doing so repeatedly closed any debate on the succession issue. While he has tended to side with Mnangagwa in dealings with the MDC-T, he has mostly favoured the Mujurus in internal ZANU-PF decisions⁴⁵.

In addition, a division has also to be made between the political and the armed side of the party. Though the security arm is highly influential, it remains behind the scene - and in the field when party "discipline" is meted out to members and the public alike - and it is not likely that Mugabe will want his eventual successor to be drawn from the ranks of the army, police, etc. as a consequence of his keenness on elected legitimacy. He will want a "politician".

As factions have seen their space to manoeuvre diminish after implementation of the GPA and as the flow of funds available in the patronage system decreased after dollarisation, Zanu-PF factional fights intensified. In all provinces even small and seemingly insignificant spats over seats or positions can erupt into violent fights as higher-ranking officials are called in to assert this or the other camp's influence.

It is likely that Mugabe, in trying to salvage the party he has built, from a devastating conflict resulting from one of these camps winning the succession strife, has prepared for a third person to take over after him. The scenario could unfold as follows: After winning his desired snap election next year, and thereby relegating MDC to the wilderness for a further five years (in which it must be expected that Tsvangirai will be ousted and further leadership wrangles will weaken the party), a possible Mugabe strategy could be to abdicate and impose this 'third man' on the party as his successor - in the process ensuring his own and other vulnerable top-officials of protection and reorienting the party for yet another long run at the helm of the country.⁴⁶

3.2 MDC-T, TROUBLED REFORMERS

MDC-T entered into the GPA partly because SADC leaned heavily upon it to do so, partly out of the calculation that given Zanu-PF's control over the security apparatus, and its willingness to use it ruthlessly, the party would be better positioned to effect change from inside rather than outside Government.

Events have so far proved them right. The breathing space was established. Repression has diminished, some reforms, notably in the economic field have been executed, and hope still exists for further democratic reform.

Since the formation of the Inclusive Government MDC has seen service delivery as an important political strategy to prove to the people of Zimbabwe that it 1) is capable of improving people's lives and 2) is fit to govern.

"You now know what your party can do ever since we got into the inclusive government in 2009. The schools and hospitals were not working but the MDC has managed to breathe new life into all that,"

Finance Minister Tendai Biti recently told a voters' meeting.⁴⁷



As noted earlier, as the party concentrated on delivering service it appears to have underestimated the reality of power politics. MDC-T has been lacking in taking political initiatives and has rather been re-active to Zanu-PF initiatives. For a party whose slogan is *chinjira!* - "change" - this has been a dangerous course. As the year went by, a growing number of supporters felt deserted or even dismissive towards their party's chance of ever achieving its goals.

A number of key contestations during 2010 will illustrate the point

1. Farm invasions, violence and intimidation

Preparations for the Zanu-PF 5-yearly conference in December 2009 sucked much energy out of the party as factions and camps jockeyed for position. In November and December, MDC seemed to be gaining influence week by week. But hardly had the conference ended before the party returned to the national scene with a vengeance: Countrywide white-owned farms were invaded and owners forced out, often violently and in contravention of court orders. MDC-T protested in Harare, but otherwise watched helplessly as this happened on the ground. As the year went on, it eventually stopped reacting publicly. Whether out of tactical reasons for not wishing to be seen protecting whites or realising it had no means of influencing the invasions, it appeared not to be a caring party.

Similarly, the PM and his party rarely react strongly in public or send messages in private to the increasing number of party faithful who fall victim to violent assaults from police,

army or rampaging Zanu-PF youths. To the public, and especially to the victims, it appears as if the leadership is insensitive to their sufferings.

2. The Sanctions Issue

In January Zanu-PF launched a fervent strategy to weaken the MDC through a vigorous campaign against sanctions, claiming that Western sanctions are the cause of the country's misery and that MDC is in gross breach of the GPA by not having ensured that the sanctions are lifted. Mugabe vowed not to yield any ground to MDC before sanctions are removed. To date, he has kept to his word.

Reeling from this barrage of criticism, MDC-T found itself unable to respond convincingly - neither to the impossible demand that they remove sanctions imposed by foreign countries nor to the intransigent position of their opponent. Mugabe used the issue to skilfully strengthen his SADC and wider African platform, playing on African leaders' feelings of the continent continually being short-changed by the Western world and consequently being against any form of sanctions applied to any African, indeed any Third World, country. MDC looked on, seemingly helplessly lost for answers; eventually, as the party joined the chorus demanding sanctions lifted, they seemed either meek or insincere. By August, Mugabe had gathered so much support for his argument that a SADC summit passed a resolution stating that the sanctions are hurting the entire SADC region's economy.

African leaders are now united on the Zimbabwe issue. Not united in a call for reforms - but in the Mugabe-engineered call for sanctions to be removed. South African President Zuma on his September visit to Europe and USA in September urged leaders there to lift them. It was a win-win situation for Mugabe: Africa would have triumphed if they were lifted. Africa was reconfirmed in its belief of being unfairly treated as Europe and America rejected their demand. Africa once again looked at MDC and Tsvangirai as being un-African, and Mugabe's notion that the party is merely a Western puppet was reinforced.

Sanctions has boomeranged for the donors to constitute a tactical advantage for Zanu-PF, as they use the issue to shield them against discussing more real issues. Donors are reluctantly facing the reality that the sanctions have not led to their intended effect and likely never will - while at the same time the issue is weakening MDC-T.

3. Indigenisation

During the early part of 2010 MDC managed to persuade still more foreign companies to invest in the country's rich future, mainly in the potentially rich, but under-funded and underutilised mining sector, and in the manufacturing sector too. Jobs would be created. During the 2009 Christmas season Zanu-PF had watched shoppers perform impromptu song-and-dance performances in Harare supermarkets thanking Biti for having "brought the dollar", filling the shelves with goods. Biti was Father Christmas incarnated. Zanu-PF realised that MDC would be credited with the new jobs. Power politics came first.

In late 2007, shortly before parliament was dissolved in preparation for the March 2008 elections, the then Zanu-PF dominated assembly passed The Indigenisation And Economic Empowerment Act. Purposing to empower black Zimbabweans this requires every non-African-owned company to transfer 51 per cent of its ownership to indigenous people, i.e. non-whites⁴⁸. The law did however not have any legal consequences as necessary regulations were to be gazetted as a pre-requisite for this, and after Tsvangirai and MDC-T joined Government in 2009 they soothed local and foreign business people, that the law was inconsequential as Government would never pass these regulations.

However, on Wednesday, February 10, the Prime Minister realised that the regulations had secretly been gazetted by Zanu-PF's up-coming star, Youth and Indigenisation Minister Saviour Kasukuwere on Friday the week before. Tsvangirai furiously dismissed the regulations as they had neither been discussed nor agreed in Cabinet: "They were published without due process as detailed in the GPA and the Constitution and they are therefore null and void". Smarting from this dramatically humiliating demonstration of his political impotency in a crucial matter, he however has had to realise that in the world of dirty power-politics, a gazetted law and its regulations is in force. As MDC committed the tactical error of not fighting the Act as such, only the regulations, the Act is still on the books. All MDC-T has achieved in this regard is to alter a few details, most importantly that the black ownership of companies will be

decided by committees according to branch of industry and that it can be less than 51 per cent. Needless to say, Kasukuwere has stacked the committees with Zanu-PF stalwarts and allies.

As the business community buzzed with anxiety, white business owners trembled with fear and rage and MDC was left dazed and confused, Zanu-PF and Mugabe had once again created a platform from which they could only win: The Act will enable the party leadership to once again confiscate valuable possessions to dole out to party faithful through its patronage system, as it did with the farms. It immediately scared off the foreign investors leaving MDC with egg in its face after having campaigned hard to declare the country a safe investment. Finally, it has provided the party with a powerful populist message in direct continuation of the sanctions and notably the land issues: That Africa is for Africans and that Mugabe is at the helm of a move to resurrect African pride and return to Africans what is rightfully theirs⁴⁹. Whilst most Zimbabweans are likely to see through this, it might still impress other African leaders sufficiently to ensure they will not risk being seen as interfering with Mugabe's election.

4. Commissions

While Mugabe and Zanu-PF has been careful to be seen to respect its GPA obligations towards SADC, they have ensured that the talks have been much prolonged, frustrated - and ultimately resulting in no significant results. After a long delay the President moved to swear in members of three independent committees required in the GPA, the Zimbabwean Electoral Committee (ZEC), the Zimbabwe Media Committee (ZMC) and the Human Rights Committee (HRC) - all chaired by men of good reputation for independence and integrity.

On this issue too, MDC-T appear to have been outmanoeuvred as Zanu-PF ensured that the secretariat of these bodies were staffed mainly by party loyalists from the former, not-so-independent commissions performing the similar tasks.⁵⁰

The ZMC has accredited journalists and licensed a few new newspapers, read almost exclusively by urbanites, viewed by Zanu-PF as 'lost' anyway. However it has remained unbowed in its resistance to open up the airwaves for private radio or TV-stations and is still firmly in control over Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation, the country's most important media - the rural areas' only media.

ZEC is hardly operating due to lack of funds .

HRC too is seriously under-funded, is not mandated to deal with cases from before the implementation of the IG and anyway, it will only be proper operational when the committee's tasks are defined in an act, which has yet to be presented in Parliament.

5. Outstanding issues

Throughout the life of the coalition government MDC-T has been without reach of extracting any concessions on these. Zanu-PF understands well that facts on the ground are difficult to eliminate, and it moves accordingly.

6. Corrupting MDC

MDC-T seems to have overlooked that to its urban voters "delivering services" is not exclusively the responsibility for ministers in Harare, but it is equally the actions of their local city councillors. Two shrewd Zanu-PF initiatives have seriously impeded this. Foreseeing that the party would lose most town councils to MDC, from 2000 onwards, Zanu-PF has gradually transferred still more control over the municipal administration from the local councils to the Ministry of Local Government under party veteran Ignatius Chombo. Whenever MDC-led councils attempt to counter Zanu-PF directives, the minister annuls these. Another tactics applied by the minister is to supplement an MDC-dominated council with so-called "special interest councillors", appointed directly by him.

In what appears to be a pattern, council clerks⁵³ have in many towns succeeded in corrupting the newly elected and often inexperienced MDC councillors by offering them building plots, so-called stands, in commercial or residential areas, or by allocating them precious stands in market places. In one sleepy rural town, each of the eight councillors, all MDC-T, have each taken control of 30 stands and are busy reselling them. "We are not voting for them next time," a citizen of Masvingo deeply involved in local and MDC-T politics recently stated after recounting how every single MDC-T member of the council corruptly have acquired attractive commercial or residential stands. MDC has been very slow in reacting to this trend but did in February 2010 dismiss the entire council in the vast Harare high-density suburb Chitungwiza, the country's largest council, for graft. The following day, Chombo refused to remove the councillors and they are still occupying their seats as independents.

3.2.1. NEW DETERMINATION?

Tsvangirai and MDC-T's position has been likened to that of a battered wife who remains with her violent husband, as the children are still in the house - working on a lasting solution while her husband continue abusing her.

On this background it remains to be seen whether Tsvangirai's hard-line stand of October 7 will be reflected in action asserting MDC-T towards Zanu-PF. It should be noted that the action apparently spurred Mugabe into re-acting by his rapidly following blitz for early elections. Tsvangirai quickly declared that he, too, is ready for early elections.

One development to watch is whether the MDC-T minister for Constitutional and Parliamentary Affairs make a serious attempt at taking control over the referendum over the on draft constitution and in doing so by implication also over the Voters' Roll etc.

3.3. MDC-M: A MOUSE THAT ROARS

Due to suspension of three MPs, the party's parliamentary representation was by November 2010 down to only 7 seats. MDC-M has however managed to ascertain a certain political influence due to its status as equal signatory to the GPA and its leader's consequent position as deputy PM. As such, party leader Mutambara has toured the world, influenced SADC partners and occasionally opened doors for President Mugabe⁵⁴.

The party is mainly backed by voters in Matabeleland, but after the re-establishment of this region's formerly dominant party, ZAPU, opinion polls suggest that MDC-M stands very little chance of gaining any seats of consequence in Parliament⁵⁵ at the next election. Ncube himself failed to win a seat in the 2008-elections and has had to manoeuvre vigorously in order to be appointed minister and thus gain access to the above-mentioned official positions. Recently, the party has seen a raft of defections to MDC-T and ZAPU.

MDC-M has especially managed to assert influence over the Constitution-Making Process as its representative, Professor Ncube is part of the Management Committee, which is tasked with overseeing the process. Even though the process is supposedly run by Copac, the Management Committees' most powerful members⁵⁶, The Negotiators, has united across party lines to subordinate Copac to its will. And in the group, the Professor apparently often gets the last word. He is reportedly a skilful negotiator and a fearless enforcer of his will.

MDC-M has increasingly sided with Mugabe. In August 2010 Mutambara wrote the SADC special representative on Zimbabwe, South African President Jacob Zuma, to inform him that The Principals had agreed to appoint provincial governors only when Western sanctions were removed. This not only ran contrary to the parties' agreement presented at the SADC summit in Windhoek shortly after, but served to reinforce Zanu-PF's crucial hard-line stance on the sanctions issue. Tsvangirai furiously informed Zuma that Mutambara's claim was false. In October, following Tsvangirai's actions over Mugabe's unilateral appointment of governors and ambassadors, Mutambara once again sided with Mugabe and told Parliament that Tsvangirai was "ill-advised" in his position⁵⁷.

The party will most likely seek to increase its influence by following two distinct tactics:

1. Prolong the life of the IG as long as possibly in order to avoid any scrutiny by voters before the party or its leaders has repositioned in Zimbabwe's political landscape. "An election now will not result in proper change but divide the nation and undo the gains so far," Influential General-Secretary Welshman Ncube pointed out in an interview shortly after Mugabe in October demanded the June-2011 elections. Whereas the party has no say over the calling of elections, Ncube is in a strong position to ensure that Copac sticks closely to its prescribed course whatever time this might take.
2. In extension of this the party will seek to position itself as king-maker, or at least as an unavoidable facilitator between Mugabe and Tsvangirai in order to extract for itself as much immediate and future leverage as possible. Ncube has already initiated this process by re-writing history in claiming that "we were the unifying factor [in creating the GPA]. We brought Tsvangirai and Mugabe together to the negotiating table under harsh conditions."⁵⁸

3.4 ELECTIONS?

Will there be elections in mid-2011? Mugabe might find himself in a position where he will be forced to retreat from his demand unless he engineers a breakdown of the GPA. Several solid obstacles stand in his way to early elections, not least the GPA's requirement of the writing and implementation of a new constitution. Only days before Mugabe's declaration, Copac, the parliamentary select committee responsible for the Constitution-Making Process, estimated that the necessary referendum on the constitution would take place at the earliest in July 2011. Given the fact that Copac has a solid record of not delivering any of its public actions on time, this seemed an optimistic estimate, with the referendum more likely being undertaken in September or October (Mugabe has expressed his desire for a referendum in March). Indeed, one very significant party representative in the process, the MDC-M's General-Secretary, Professor Welshman Ncube, even suggested that the proposed text would be ready only by the end of 2011.

In addition to this is the contentious issue of restoration of the Voters' Roll. It might well be argued by MDC that this should be completed before the referendum, and the commission stated in July that it would need a year to clean up the roll, which is "in shambles."⁵⁹ Confirming the need to restore this roll, in November 2010, ZEC chairman Simpson Mutambanengwe indicated that with the allocation of sufficient funds a voters' roll that "is acceptable and that satisfies all stakeholders" could be restored for 2011 elections. He did however assert the authority of ZEC over politicians by adding that "... whether conditions are conducive ... can only be determined by ZEC."⁶⁰

There is reason to dwell a bit on Professor Ncube, as he is one of Zimbabwe's most skilled politicians. His reasons for the interjection could be interpreted as being less concerned with the mechanics of constitution-making and more with the fact that his party is likely to be virtually wiped out in a forthcoming elections. Neither he nor his party is in a hurry for such elections. Ncube is mounting a credible campaign to replace party president Arthur Mutambara

at the party conference in early 2011. By doing so, he will consequently be conferred the prestigious post of deputy prime minister and ascend to the coveted third place in the leadership of the country, next to Mugabe and Tsvangirai. He asserts considerable influence over Copac as the most influential member of the Management Committee responsible for all policy issues pertaining the CMP.

Calling an election is initiated by dissolving Parliament⁶¹ - and without the Parliament, the new constitution cannot be legally processed. The implementation of a new constitution is the centrepiece of the GPA, and the parties to the agreement will likely be reluctant to ask for SADC's backing to scrap this and head straight for elections under the present constitution.

In defending the CMP and the GPA Ncube can be a formidable challenge for Mugabe. At the same time, there is no love lost between Ncube and his former party president, Morgan Tsvangirai. MDC-T courted in September MDC-M with an invitation to re-uniting, but this immediately rebuffed by Ncube.

Finally, holding elections is costly and MDC-T controls the Government coffers. Finance Minister Biti has revealed that Mugabe has ordered him to allocate sufficient funds for the CMP referendum and elections in the 2011-budget. Biti has stated that the cost of this is US\$ 200 million, which the Government do not have, and that he fears that elections in 2011 will destroy the economic recovery he has worked so hard to bring about. Both are indications that he will go to great lengths in hindering early elections.

Finally, it is known that the political wing of Zanu-PF is overwhelmingly against early elections, notably the party's Politburo⁶². There are however a number of signs that the security wing is actively preparing for the campaign: In October, Brigadier-General Douglas Nyikayaramba, widely understood to have been in charge of the violent campaign during the run-up to the June 2008 elections, summoned 200 traditional leaders to a weekend workshop at Brigade barracks in Mutare instructing them how to block MDC from holding meetings; army personnel have been deployed to rural areas in the Midland and Masvingo provinces; media and human rights groups are reporting an upsurge in politically instigated violence⁶³; CIO has during October on several occasions moved to confiscate donated portable radios (which could be used to listen to alternative radio stations broadcasting on shortwave, such as the VOA's Radio 7 and the London-based SWRadio)⁶⁴.

The only viable argument for believing that elections will eventually take place as wanted by Mugabe is - that he wants it. This might however be sufficient. One possible strategy for Mugabe could be for Zanu-PF to pull out of the Inclusive Government and terminating the GPA⁶⁵ (perhaps in a deal with MDC-M). After this there will likely be no other way to terminate the ensuing impasse than through elections (under the prevailing constitution) - no matter how poorly prepared these might be. SADC will be hard pressed to find a robust response to such realities on the ground.



Foto: Time Harden

4

CIVIL SOCIETY



Foto: Tine Harden

There is no popular tradition for Zimbabweans to band together in independently formed organisations. Consequently, there is no solid tradition for civil society organisations in Zimbabwe - with churches and trade unions as notable exceptions.

Before independence, the white regime would ban or harass black-dominated organisations. With the advance of nationalist movements these tended to subordinate any other organisation in the name of unity. As these movements took power in 1980, they continued to dominate even ostensibly non-political movements - from Zimbabwe National Traditional Healers' Organisation over the Council of Churches to Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions.

Only slowly began some of these organisations to wrest themselves free from the parties' dominance, notably the trade unions. Later, in the 1990'ies, rights-based organisations were established, followed by a plethora of diverse, independent organisations or locally established branches of international NGOs. Today, Zimbabwe is host to a magnificent number of NGOs and CSOs.

A large number of these have certain national characteristics. Perhaps due to Zimbabwe's high standard of education and fine tradition in civil service, many CSOs tend to have adopted governmental attitudes guiding their work and their mode of operation. Their leaders are university-educated for government work or they have been recruited



Foto: Tine Harden

directly from Government. Many organisations are consequently fairly elitist, top-managed and often rather bureaucratic in approach to even outright political issues. This has undoubtedly aided many NGOs and CSOs in becoming efficient service providers. Great work is being done in the Zimbabwean CSOs. The approach does however seem to hamper them in approaching rights-based issues and in assisting ordinary people in their quest to improve their lives. "They prefer to be watchdogs filing reports, not attack dogs fighting repression" as one experienced NGO official says of his colleagues. This is of course understandable - a dog that bites risks being kicked or even put down, if it does not protect itself well, for instance by moving in a large pack.

The governmental approach is reflected in the attitude of many leaders of Zimbabwean CSOs towards their members and the public. They often refer to these as someone they should educate rather than someone to take guidance from in representing them - and in doing so building protection.

Compounding this is the fact that only a small proportion of the vast amount of Zimbabwean CSOs are membership-based. In addition, the majority is rooted in urban areas, notably Harare. Even after several decades of realising that the political power in Zimbabwe mainly rests in the rural areas and that the rural areas are host to the majority of people needing the largest improvement in livelihood, the rural areas are practically nude of locally implanted or - connected CSOs. Some watchdog organisations might have local representatives in rural areas, the umbrella National Association of NGOs has so in each district, but it appears that their task is mainly that as of conduits of infor-

mation, mainly by disseminating information from the organisation's top and secondly by gathering information for the organisation's head quarters. They are rarely autonomous local leaders linked to a national network.

Once again, the main exceptions are churches and labour unions. The latter have suffered a great loss by their leadership having emigrated to form MDC. Following this, the economic downturn, the loss of educated citizens to mass-emigration and the devastation of the farm-working community (farm-workers constituted Zimbabwe's second-largest union) have robbed the labour movement of hundreds of thousands of members and further eroded its ability to project influence. Once again, union members might be rural, but their membership affiliation is in general to the centrally based organisation, not to a local one. Teachers' unions are exceptions to this, all three have moved closer since the formation of the IG in order to better advance teachers' causes, and promoting good education.

During the 1990's, a number of smaller rural groups was however established. As they started asserting their members interests, this was often felt as challenging Zanu-PF positions and structures. Consequently, during the late 1990's, the Zanu-PF leadership by co-opting traditional leaders and by creating administrative structures that exert great influence over life in the rural areas raised serious obstacles to block the rise of rural CSOs. They assert tight control over national NGOs involved locally, whether for food aid or any other purpose, exercising power politics over any other policy. "Their only way in is via very political issues that really attract people," says an observer.

Given this background, the Zimbabwean CSOs' response to the GPA might be better understood: The large number of CSOs previously occupied with issues pertaining to health, education, governance, finance, business, etc., even rights and residents' issues, are feeling disoriented as MDC ministers have taken over their role of articulating and even acting on these issues. "There is a certain sense that things are now working again," says one CSO executive. These CSOs consequently feel "emptied" of tasks. They even shy away from upholding their traditional role of criticising Government as this is now represented by their usual allies; they fear weakening their own short-term goals in doing so.

Consequently, the CSOs which come out as those faring best under the GPA are the Human Rights watchdog organisations, as Zanu-PF has ensured that their workload has not diminished significantly. They continue to do their excellent work, perhaps even spurred on by cautions and critical attitude to the GPA and the IG.

Other NGOs have concentrated on service delivery on the basis of foreign funding, relieving Government of its obligations to deliver water, health, etc. Many shy away from combining this with advocating policy or governance issues - perhaps feeling a certain relief in concentrating on uncontroversial and immediately rewarding tasks after years of confrontations with the regime. They are enjoying their breathing space. "And when our organisation keep reminding them of the importance of these issues, there's a growing tendency to look at us disapprovingly as if saying 'don't you have anything else to do?'" laments one of the above-mentioned CSO executives.

CSOs' approach to the CMP also appears more logical on this background. Given the objection to anything not fully in compliance with the concept of a "people-driven" process, most CSOs were from the outset apprehensive of the Copac process. Zanu-PF's disruption of the Stakeholder Conference in July 2009 seemed to vindicate their position that the process was seriously flawed. There was only little discussion of whether a people-driven concept was even tenable under the given political conditions and whatever was undertaken, it was inconsequential. Rather, the apprehension led most CSOs to sort of 'forget about' or ignore the CMP. As the organisation of the process appeared somewhat chaotic and certainly severely delayed, they seemed to distance themselves further from it - they certainly did not react by investing much effort in assisting the process. Neither did they, as noted above, utilise the process to "educate" the rural and peri-urban population on constitutional issues, in spite of their often stated intention to do so, and in spite of the process opening up space for them here. Rather, they held dozens of meetings in the larger cities, mainly criticising and guarding themselves against the CMP. "We discussed the Copac talking points and trained people. This took place mainly in Harare. The CSOs wrote their positions on constitutional issues," as one CSO official recounts the organisations' response to the CMP.

"Well, how could they have moved into rural areas?" adds another CSO executive - "they are deep down in their souls urban and they are not membership-based." In addition, past experiences and the tight administrative control over rural areas seemed to have shied away the CSOs from rural engagement. As "the only way in is via very political issues that really attract people," perhaps constitutional issues would have been such issues, but once again, the governmental attitude did not facilitate this approach.

The CSO CMP flagship was the establishment of a monitoring mechanism, ZZICOMP, a standard watchdog body tasked with following the outreach program and report on violations of citizens' right to express themselves freely. In a knee-jerk reaction, local authorities and even the Copac leadership initially sought to bar the monitors from fulfilling this role, but later accepted them after having demanded their accreditation with Copac. "We won a small victory by having Copac accepting the ZZICOMP observers, but there were too many violations" says a CSO executive. As a result, the violations were recorded, not sought to be stopped. And as a further result, the field was left open for Zanu-PF to re-assert its authority.

4.1 THE AFRICAN EXAMPLES

There are a number of interesting similarities between the Zimbabwean struggle for democratic reforms and the South African during the 1980'ies. In both countries what appear as the vast majority of citizens is in conflict with the ruling regime over practically everything from democratic rights to water delivery.

In round figures, 70 years after the formation of ANC and 25 years after the infamous Sharpeville incident, the struggle for democracy in South Africa took a dramatic upswing in the 1980'ies, which finally carried the effort to success. At the foundation of this was the formation all over South Africa of so-called "civic organisations", local organisations rooted in local dissatisfaction with everyday issues: The unpaved township roads, the lack of street lamps, the cost of service charges, the arrogance of local councillors, poor schools and abusive teachers, etc. Often led by local mid-level-educated persons, teacher, social workers, nurses etc., they rallied their neighbours around these issues, exerting pressure on the local authorities, attaining improving local living conditions by winning these contests, increased their members' confidence in doing so and grew reputations as genuinely representative of their local areas. Nobody paid them any per diems. They were biting local authorities but were (partly, admittedly) protected by their numbers. As these civic organisations banded together in the United Democratic Front in 1983, a formidable political force was created.

There are of course dissimilarities between Zimbabwe and South Africa - the regime was white, the local areas building civic organisations were semi-urban towns, communications in South Africa was better than in today's Zimbabwe, etc. But still: Isn't there some very important lessons to learn for Zimbabweans in this example?

Similarly, in Kenya, Ghana and Nigeria, CSOs have successfully built local structures rallying people around their livelihood issues and projected these into national politics in order to assist people to improve their lives.

4.2 DISORIENTATION

"We used to work in close cooperation with movements", says one CSO executive. "But the workers', students', constitutional and umbrella movements seems to have disintegrated. We are left standing alone, struggling to re-ignite our people, but fear is instilled in them."

It is true that CSOs do not have easy working conditions. They have faced years of repression and intimidation. Whenever any of their leaders attempt to seriously challenge authorities they face immediate repercussions. On the crucial diamond issue, CSOs involved in monitoring violations in the diamond areas and informing international NGOs on the issue, are closely monitored, even when operating abroad. Farai Maguwu, director of the Mutare-based Centre for Research and Development, was arrested in June 2010 on allegations he passed false information on rights violations in Chiadzwa to the Kimberley process monitor Abbey Chikane. Maguwu was detained for over a month. He was later freed on bail but ordered to reside at his Mutare residence. Charges against him were dropped in October 2010.

By his blitz for early elections, President Mugabe appears to have had profound impact on civil society, which greeted the announcement with fears of another violent election. Harare-based NGOs are busying themselves with alarmist papers and workshops on the fears of violence and the listing of demands that authorities ought to have

dealt with long ago. One NGO executive says of this: "22 CSOs held a workshop in early 2009 to ascertain the implications of the GPA and the IG. We looked at scenarios and agreed that the following would be likely: The CMP would be flawed. There would be no meaningful opening of media space. Violence would continue on fluctuating levels. Elections would come in mid-2011 as Zanu-PF had recovered its strength. Having reached this understanding we agreed we should all aim our work towards ensuring that such elections could be as free and fair as possible. Then everybody went home and continued life as usual, and no serious actions were drawn from our conclusions."

Consequently, Mugabe's October statement shocked and frightened civil society. Shortly after, representatives of 50 leading CSOs held a two-day seminar to discuss their response, convened by Zimbabwe Election Support Network. The talks resulted in no less than 26 sharply formulated demands for others to act⁶⁶ - and a chillingly apathetic statement from Rindai Chipfunde-Vava, the director of ZESN, on the impotency of Zimbabwe's leading CSOs: "The most we can do is meet and discuss, despite these big fears for violence because our hands are tied. It is very true we might analyze very good papers on the Zimbabwe situation, but in terms of the strategy and the way forward, that becomes a problem because certain things are beyond our control". Chipfunde-Vava said nothing new was raised at the meeting ... "We are pointing those loopholes, what needs to be done, it is very important. As civic groups our basic function is to advocate, inform and educate and lobby for things to take place. In terms of whether those things take place or not is beyond our means," she explained."⁶⁷



Foto: Tine Harden

5

THREATS TO REFORM

Within SADC and in Zanu-PF too, the need for any government to win a majority of votes in elections is recognized as a necessary pre-requisite for legitimately governing the country. No matter what, the contest for power in Zimbabwe will be leading to elections sooner or later.

5.1. THREE DISTINCT THREATS

Apart from the difficulties and trends identified above, three major threats to democratic reforms can be identified.

1. The perception in Zanu-PF that the party has an undeniable right to rule the country.
2. A further reluctance to relinquish power amongst higher-ranking officials, including the security wing, aware of their vulnerability towards criminal prosecution should their present shield of impunity be lost. This most likely include most of the party leadership, including many officials all the way down to district and even ward level.
3. Corruption of MDC officials.

There is every reason to take dead seriously remarks such as Mutasa's: "ZANU PF will never hand over power to MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai, even if he wins next year's elections ... If we go to the polls and he defeats Mugabe, ZANU PF and the people of Zimbabwe will not allow that", quoted above. There are undoubtedly very influential and able people ready to execute such a strategy. However, given SADC guarantees for transfer of power in the case of a Zanu-PF defeat the above scenario will require assassinations or a military coup. Neither the legitimacy-seeking Mugabe nor SADC is likely to accept this - though rogue elements could operate on their own.

However, long before the nation reaches this stage, dirty tricks could be played on MDC-T in order to obstruct its ability to fight elections successfully. MP's could be arrested and jailed in order to rob the party of the ability to introduce reforms. Likewise ministers, notably a key person like Tendai Biti.

Assassination of Tsvangirai would however not be sufficient to ward off a MDC-T victory; other leaders would take over

and the electorate might even respond with increased support. Also, Zanu-PF regard Tsvangirai as incompetent and will likely prefer him as manager of the party they have to defeat in spite of his popular appeal.

A massive campaign of blatant violence as in the run-up to the June elections is unlikely to be executed as this could trigger SADC into actions resulting in for Zanu-PF unforeseen consequences. However, its security chiefs are no strangers to a steady campaign of less conspicuous acts of intimidation and violence and indeed, to this day SADC has had ample evidence presented to it to act on such violations during the life of the IG - without ever warning or protesting against it.

Tsvangirai has repeatedly stated that he wants "peace-keepers" in the country for the elections. It is unimaginable that Zanu-PF will accept any other substantial international body playing a role in the elections apart from SADC and AU. It is equally unimaginable that the party will accept any armed foreign contingent, and Tsvangirai's claim must be interpreted as either a bargaining chip or posturing.

Impunity for the Zanu-PF leadership, notably security chiefs, in case the party should lose, will be key to a transition of power. For a detailed discussion of this, please see last year's report, "Breathing Space - Zimbabwe's golden opportunity for reform?" at www.ms.dk/sw144745.asp, notably "Scenario 2" and the section titled The military is both lock and key, as the general conditions remain unchanged and conclusions are still valid - notably that fact that

Much will depend on the MDC's ability to win sufficient confidence amongst the most powerful dozen of armed forces leaders to initiate dialogue.

Any transitional measures or guarantees to be offered will be settled through closeted negotiations with these. As Governments come and go in most countries, any guarantee issued by other countries' leaders, even regional ones, is unlikely to be sufficiently efficient for these Zimbabweans seeking impunity. Rather a more stable and influential re-

gional entity such as South Africa's ANC will be able to act as a crucial intermediary.

It is equally a possibility, as mentioned in last year's report, that the outcome in case of an MDC-T victory will be yet another SADC-enforced coalition government, this time with MDC-T in the driver's seat, but with Zanu-PF in control of key security posts, as this is the only ultimate guarantee the security chiefs risking prosecution and their allies can obtain.

SADC is under-funded and international donors could play a role in assisting the alliance to mount a substantial monitoring machine. In addition, SADC election observation regulations allow for unarmed police officers to be seconded to such an operation, perhaps adding robust people to the contingent - this is likely the most Tsvangirai can hope for in the field of robust foreign interventions to guarantee a free and fair contest. Apart from that, that stark reality is that Zimbabweans in this respect are likely to remain dependent on nobody but themselves.

The apparently easy corrupting of some MDC officials is deeply worrying. So far, no one in the party's top leadership has been exposed as having succumbed to such practices. Zimbabweans are debating whether this because it is not happening - or because it is not being exposed?

As long as the party is only moving slowly to contain it, corrupt practices risk becoming accepted: In September 2010 a group of MDC-T youths involved in internal factional party strife attacked and severely tortured staff at the party's head quarters in Harare. The leadership sought to hide the atrocities from the public., and the case only came to light as the victims sought refuge at a torture victim centre in town. Even then, the party leadership was slow in reacting to the outrage, reportedly only doing so after key donors cut of funding for party-affiliated activities.

Government salaries, even for ministers, are paltry, and the top officials are forced to live on either their own means acquired from personal businesses or allocations from friends and donors (plus lucrative per diems during their conspicuously frequent travels). This creates an environment conducive to corruption.

5.2 SANCTIONS

As demonstrated, the sanctions have not achieved their intended goal of forcing Zanu-PF to restrain from violations of human rights etc. At the most, they are a minor nuisance to the individuals targeted. On the contrary, the party has deftly transformed the issue of sanctions to its own benefit, and they might consequently presently be judged as threats to reform.

Zimbabwean CSOs are adamant sanctions must stay in place as the conditions leading to their imposition have not changed in substance. CSOs have not however had any thorough discussion on this issue and the expressed viewpoint is neither the product of specific analysis nor a determined dialogue on how the present impasse on the issue can be resolved.

Some donors have privately mooted a view that in real-politik bargaining, everybody must give and take, and they suggest that to spur Zanu-PF on to a more reform-minded policy, some sanctions could be lifted as an inducement. Zimbabwean CSOs in general scoff at this, characterising such an approach as naive given Zanu-PF's attitude to power politics.

What is however clear is the fact that they are a vehicle for dialogue with Zanu-PF. Its leaders might boast of their friends in Iran, North Korea, Sudan and China, but privately they long for visiting Europe and USA and being able to send their children to these continents' prestigious universities.

One model suggested is to link a time-limited suspension to concrete steps ensuring a free and fair election and the necessary consequences of this - and doing this through SADC. With for instance President Zuma as an intermediary, he could claim the credit for such a move while the EU would save face by not been seen as giving in directly to Zanu-PF but by achieving results from its dialogue with SADC.

5.3 THE THREATS TO NGOS

Zimbabwean NGOs are no strangers to intimidation and harassment, and in addition it should be noted that the infamous NGO Bill of 2004 banning foreign funding for NGOs has not been enforced, but could be any time.

In line with this, the US-funded Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWSNET) in early November 2010 warned that the Government could block humanitarian support for the hungry and other marginalised groups as campaigning for polls gathers momentum .

6

RECOMMENDATIONS

The situation in Zimbabwe remains fluid and highly volatile. In the coming months the country will balance on a knife's edge and risks are high that it will descend to yet another lost decade of strife and economic rot. Therefore civil society and donors alike must consider carefully their next steps.

Challenges faced by civil society

Deepening roots in Zimbabwe and strengthen national, regional and international alliances

1. Civil society needs to coordinate better among themselves and needs to go beyond city based workshops and trainings and reach out to a critical mass of rural based citizens. In this regard it will be important to reach out to and support social movements and local CBOs and to seek to develop more democratic and membership based constituencies.
2. Civil society needs to continue its pressure for full implementation of the Global Political Agreement. The agreement on a new democratic constitution is of paramount importance and real press freedom (including local radio licensing) is a fundamental prerequisite for a democratic debate.
3. Civil society should move to a more campaign based approach mobilising large constituencies in the struggle for democracy.
4. Zimbabwe's civil society should seek ways of forging solidarity ties with regional CSO partners to that may lobby their governments to influence Zimbabwe's ruling parties. CSOs in Zimbabwe should learn from and draw upon the successful international campaign for anti apartheid and democracy in South Africa.
5. In the immediate future civil society can play an immensely important role in campaigning for the urgent implementation of electoral reform and for forging national, regional and international ties to strengthen the possibility of a peaceful transfer of power should MDC win the elections.

Recommendations to donors and INGOs

1. Long-term, coordinated support to NGO projects

During the last decade most foreign donors have not supported the Government of Zimbabwe directly but have had their development projects implemented through NGOs. Mechanisms for geographical and thematic coordination and division of tasks have been inadequate. Funding has been short-term and this has promoted a short term project approach that has greatly hampered long term strategic outreach work.

- Donors/INGOs need to coordinate support to NGOs in cooperation with NANGO and should provide multi year predictable funding to NGOs.
- Funding should enable and ensure greater outreach and interaction with the rural population and support to social movements and CBOs.
- Donors/INGOs should support the creation of linkages between Zimbabwean NGOs and NGOs in neighbouring countries and should support national and international campaign work.

2. Critical engagement with the Government of Zimbabwe

Over the past year there has been a tendency that international donors have decreased its pressure on SADC to engage and its own critical dialogue and engagement with the Government in Zimbabwe. More emphasis has been put on the practical development support. The current situation, however, calls for a return to a more active engagement with SADC and stakeholders in Zimbabwe.

With strong African backing for re-engagement with the Government of Zimbabwe and for lifting of sanctions it is obvious that some kind of movement on the issue could be utilised for gaining advances. Donors should use the lifting of sanctions more actively and predictably in the negotiations with SADC as an intermediary. This could be

done by having the donor community agreeing on which steps they would be ready to take if particular key outstanding elements of the GPA are implemented. Examples of such an approach could be:

- Donors to do a suspension of travel bans on restricted persons when all Zimbabwean voters have been registered and new voter's registration list has been finalised.
- Donors to relieve some of the Government of Zimbabwe's debt when media reforms such as opening up the air waves to private radio stations as well as proper democratic control over the existing public broadcaster and publicly owned newspapers has been implemented.
- Allowing Zimbabwe to export its diamonds when rights violations in diamond areas have been halted and transparency in allocating contracts for extraction and dealing has been brought about.
- Donors to resume direct government-to-government aid when a free and fair Constitutional Referendum has been carried out.

3. Engagement of SADC and AU in the implementation of the GPA, the constitution making process and free and fair elections

It is imperative that any move towards elections in Zimbabwe once and for all will ensure that the people will vote according to conviction. However, there are a number of conditions that needs to be achieved before this can happen .

- Donors should support the finalisation of the Constitutional Making Process.
- Donors should support Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, SADC and AU to ensure that guidelines for elections and election monitoring will be upheld and a detailed roadmap for free and fair elections is developed.
- Donors should assist regional bodies to ensure that no financial constraint should impede the election preparations and that there are funds for voter registration and voter education.



Foto: Time Harden

APPENDIX

A

KEY CONCEPTS

MDC

For this report MDC-M, and MDC-T will at times be referred to as one, MDC, indicating their original status as parties in opposition to Zanu-PF. MDC-M split from the original MDC in 2005. The suffix '-M' originates in its president A. Mutambara's surname. The remaining part of MDC consequently was renamed MDC-T after party president Morgan Tsvangirai.

IPA/GPA

The agreement under the auspices of the regional cooperation body, SADC signed in august 2008 by Zimbabwe's principal political parties, MDC-T, Zanu-PF and MDC-M. Though popularly know as the Global Political Agreement, GPA, its correct name is the Inter-Party Agreement. It sets out the terms and modalities for a coalition government and the goals which this should achieve for the restoration of Zimbabwe after years of economic mismanagement and divisive political strife. It ascribes Executive and Government posts and their powers and obligations to individuals and parties. Article 6, one of its most detailed, describe a Constitution-Making Process resulting in a new Constitution. Contrary to claims, even by President Mugabe, the GPA has no expiry date and is in principle valid until the terms of the President and MP's expire in 2013. It is generally assumed that the implementation of a new constitution will be followed by the dissolution of Parliament and the holding of parliamentary and presidential elections. Zanu-PF delayed the implementation of the agreement until February 2009, when it was incorporated into the present constitution as Amendment no. 19 (though Zanu-PF managed to gazette only part of the agreement) after which the resulting Government was sworn in on February 9, 2009.

The Principals

The triumvirate overseeing the implementation of the GPA and thus formally leading Zimbabwe, consisting of the heads of Zanu-PF, MDC-T and MDC-M. The Principals are in principle meeting every Monday to troubleshoot any implementation issues referred to them by lower political levels. The meetings have often been postponed for weeks as one or several of the principals were abroad or did not avail themselves for the consultation. This has been used as a tool to avoid such decision-making on implementation, mainly by Zanu-PF to delay implementation of agreed reforms.

Outstanding issues

From the outset of the IG, Zanu-PF has been adamant not to renege on Mugabe's unilateral appointment in late 2008 of his close

confidante, Gideon Gono as Governor of the Reserve Bank and of party stalwart Johannes Tomana as Attorney General before the swearing in of the IG. In addition, he has continuously excused himself of swearing in Roy Bennett, a white farmer, as deputy agriculture minister. These and further MDC claims of Zanu-PF non-compliance with the GPA, such as appointment of governors and ambassadors, was early termed "outstanding issues" to be solved in urgent negotiations. All are still outstanding.

The Negotiators

Six influential personalities whose unofficial title is derived from them having negotiated the details of the GPA. They are often called in to represent their parties whenever hands-on trouble-shooters or managers of policy are needed. From Zanu-PF: Patrick Chinamasa and Nicholas Goche, from MDC-T: Tendai Biti and Elton Mangoma, from MDC-M: Welshman Ncube and Priscilla Misihairabwi-Mushonga. Most of them have for almost a decade been involved in negotiations representing their parties. The three influential lawyers Ncube, Chinamasa and Biti have long-standing relationships, not only professionally, but also politically, as they have been involved in negotiating their party positions with each other for more than 10 years.

CIO

Central Intelligence Organisation; a police intelligence organisation operating with all Government institutions and represented at all levels of society. Apart from intelligence gathering, the CIO is responsible for countless violations of human rights as its members have been involved in abductions, torture and killings of Zanu-PF's political adversaries. The force is believed to number about 15 - 20.000 employees and is placed under the command of minister of State Security, the discreet Sydney Sekeramayi.

JOC

The Joint Operations' Command is the supreme organ for the co-ordination of state security in Zimbabwe. It was established by the Rhodesian government and co-ordinated the counter-insurgency war during the 1970'ies, but retained its role in post-independence Zimbabwe,. It has been claimed that during the past decade, "the JOC has been behind the strategy of repression to keep Mugabe and ZANU-PF in power. It is the instrument through which Mugabe has master-minded the rigging of elections and the continuing wave of violent farm seizures." It is generally accepted that in the wake of the March 2008 presidential election, the JOC took control of the day-to-day decision-making of government, effectively operating as a military junta. Aware of

this the MDC had inscribed in the GPA a substitution of JOC by a National Security Council, headed by the President, seconded by the two MDC principals. However, the stiff resistance towards any concessions to MDC from the military leadership has resulted in the council meeting only once. It is generally believed that JOC is still fully operating, presumably still under the command of the Minister of Defence Emmerson Mnangagwa.

CMP, Constitution-Making Process

A detailed set of actions to result in a new constitution. Important events in the process are:

1. All-Stakeholder Conference embracing all important civil society groups (held July 13-14, 2009 with app. 6,000 participants).
2. Constituting Thematic committees responsible for drafting chapters of the constitution (17 is constituted, 30 per cent of each committee's members are MPs and the rest are seconded from civil society).
3. Consultations/Outeach whereby ward-based meetings countrywide solicit the wishes and opinions of the populace re a new constitution (the process has been completed with app. 4,000 meetings held from June to October 2010 with the participation of app. a million citizens).
4. Condensation of views on thematic issues by the thematic committees.
5. Drafting - "translating" the thematic reports into constitutional articles.
6. Second All-Stakeholders' Conference to adopt the draft constitution - after which parliament will adopt it too.
7. Referendum - and if passed, the signing into power by the President (if rejected, the present constitution will remain in force).

The process is guided by strict timeframes that has been dramatically exceeded. Whereas the process should have been finalised by app. August 2010 it seems likely that this will be delayed at least for a year.

Copac

The secretariat of the Parliamentary Select Committee for Constitutional Reform, responsible for the CMP. The committee is led by three co-chairmen: Paul Munyaradzi Mangwana (Zanu-PF), Edward Mkhosi (MDC-M) and Douglas Mwonzora (MDC-T).

People-Driven

Process A much coveted idea in Zimbabwe of having a constitution written by "the people", perceived as being almost anybody but politicians, but led by an independent commission constituted by civil society. The idea has been growing in influence since the mid-1990's when civil society groups led by mainly the trade union council ZCTU under the umbrella organisation National Constitution Assembly initiated a forceful campaign for a new, democratic constitution to substitute the 1979 so-called Lancaster House constitution. This mainly facilitated transfer of power from the white settler regime to a democratically elected government and as a result was a compromise document between the white Rhodesian elite, the British Government and the country's two liberation movements. Before the GPA, Zimbabwe's parliament have since amended this constitution 18 times, but not, according to civil society and MDC, to democratise but rather to concentrate power in the hands of the Zanu-PF leadership. In order to pre-empt the NCA campaign, Zanu-PF in 1999 initiated a constitution-making process which too included consultations with the general population, but in which the President used his given powers to edit the draft. NCA subsequently fought a successful campaign to defeat this in a referendum in 2000. Encouraged by this, the NCA has since perceived itself as the guardian of constitutional reform (and bearing the brunt of the Zanu-PF regime's repression of this popular demand). NCA has bitterly accused MDC of betrayal as it

signed the GPA and consequently accepted its described process which NCA vehemently oppose, calling it a 'politician-driven' process.

A 'people-driven' process as understood by the NCA has not been utilised anywhere in the world, though popular consultations have been widely used in several constitutional revisions, lately with good results in Kenya.

Sanctions

In response to the flawed elections of 2002, the violent farm invasions and further violations of human rights, a number of countries imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe. Most consequential are the US and EU measures (which in this report will be broadly referred to as "the sanctions"). Beginning in 2002 by prohibiting its member states to export arms to Zimbabwe, the EU later expanded its sanctions to include so-called "restrictive measures" against specific members of the Zanu-PF party leadership and companies or parastatals they control plus key collaborators. The listed individuals had their assets in Europe frozen and are denied access to EU territory, and EU member states, individuals and companies cannot do business with the listed companies. The measures has since been expanded to include 203 individuals and 40 companies (as per the latest adjustment in February 2010). The US sanctions were introduced in 2003 and are similar 'smart' sanctions targeting individuals and companies. None of the sanctions include trade or financial sanctions as those imposed on apartheid South Africa in the 1980's.

2008-elections

So-called 'harmonised' Presidential, Parliament and local council elections took place on 29 March 2008, almost without violence and intimidation. A number of new election regulations, mainly posting of election results at every voting station, had reduced the possibility of tampering with the results. After five days results for the Parliament's lower House of Assembly were announced. MDC-T had won by gaining 99 seats followed by Zanu-PF 97, MDC-M 10. A single independent candidate was also elected (the independent Jonathan Moyo has since regained his membership in Zanu-PF). The result of the Presidential contest was however not announced, and as time went by, Zimbabweans in general became suspicious that Mugabe had lost and that the authorities were busy fiddling with the results. In MDC-T fear of rigging and violence set in and Tsvangirai left the country, staying outside for more than a month during the coming weeks. Five weeks after the elections the Commission announced on 5 May a second round of elections would be held on 27 June as none of the candidates had achieved more than 50 per cent. Within Zanu-PF the political wing of the party was scathingly criticised for having lost Mugabe's election, and it is widely believed that the security wing, "the ruffians" also called, now took control. They unleashed a veritable campaign of terror, resulting in the maiming of thousands of MDC-T supporters and officials and the killing of 200-400. Tsvangirai withdrew from the second round a week before it was scheduled to take place, citing violence against his party's supporters, and Mugabe was elected unopposed. The campaign of violence, likely the worst since the liberation war, has deeply scarred the population and the conflict-prone co-existence of the bitter political rivals in the IG and the continued practise of security forces to intimidate opponents of Zanu-PF have prevented any meaningful healing.

APPENDIX

B

CIVIC SOCIETY STATEMENT ON THE
IMPENDING REFERENDUM AND ELECTIONS

Written by Crisis Publications
Monday, 01 November 2010

The Zimbabwe Election Support Network the leading independent network on elections in Zimbabwe convened a conference in Vumba - Leopard Rock Hotel which brought together various organisations and partners working on elections to deliberate on electoral issues in light of the possible referendum on the new constitution and elections in 2011.

The conference was held under the theme: Enhancing Mutual Cooperation and Interaction on election Related activities amongst CSOs. Ninety participants attended the conference and deliberated on Zimbabwe's preparedness for a referendum and elections in which they noted that the environment was not conducive for holding democratic elections particularly considering the following;

- * The political environment remains highly volatile, uncertain, and tense. The polarized environment-does not favor holding of elections as violence would most likely erupt.
- * The GNU has not repealed repressive legislation such as the Public Order Security Act (POSA), the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) and the Broadcasting Services Act.
- * These Acts have restricted people's civil liberties and freedoms of expression and association and they are inimical to the holding of free and fair elections.
- * Institutions and infrastructure that support violence such as the Youth militia, war veterans and a partisan security force remain unreformed and therefore a threat to democratic elections
- * The safety of human rights defenders and activists remains an issue of concern as this curtails the oversight function of civic society.

Civic society organisations represented therefore demanded the following;

- * A total end and denunciation of politically related violence and prosecution of the perpetrators of all forms of political violence
- * That SADC ensures a non violent, free and fair election that respects the will of the people of Zimbabwe.
- * That, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) be capacitated

and resourced to improve its ability to manage elections efficiently and effectively.

- * That there is need for complete overhaul and restructuring of ZEC secretariat with a view to reform the institution into a professional body that is non-partisan.
- * That ZEC be in charge of all electoral processes including voter registration and control, compile and update of voters' rolls.
- * That the ZEC be a truly independent electoral body that is accountable.
- * That there is need to do an overhaul review of the voters' roll before the next elections
- * That media freedoms be restored and guaranteed particularly the liberalization of the state media and licensing of independent radio and television stations;
- * That police presence should be limited to outside the polling station where incidences of violence are most likely to occur.
- * That the Presidential powers and temporary measures Act be made of no effect during election time as it gives unfair advantage to one particular political party.
- * That, the right of assembly be restored and guaranteed;
- * That, the legislative framework for the elections be clarified as quickly as possible, while ensuring the greatest possible degree of consensus between election stakeholders and participation of relevant local and international organizations;
- * The elections be administered at every level in an impartial and professional manner;
- * Parties in the inclusive government look at the interests and fears of the security chiefs and open negotiations with them with a view of making sure that they do not interfere with the electoral process.

- * That the inclusive government ensures that a national election communication centre is set up and accessible to all political players and stakeholders and that results be announced as they come from the various centres before there is any possibility for manipulation by those with access to the process.

- * Civic society also demanded reforms that provide for early accreditation and the safety of local and international observers.
- * The role of inviting and accrediting of all observers should fall under the election management body. Adequate numbers of observers need to be accredited early (as soon as proclamation is done) and deployed to all areas of the country.
- * The election should be monitored and supervised by regional and international bodies such as SADC, the African Union and United Nations who are present well in advance of the polls, and post-polling day.
- * Emphasis was on the need for transparency in all processes of the elections which include; results management and announcement, transparency in the production of ballot materials and processing of special and postal votes
- * Participation of diaspora in the electoral process
- * Guarantee of peace and mechanisms that ensure flawless installation of winners into government.

With a view of improving future elections, CSOs proposed that reforms are a matter of urgency and imperative before elections are held. The present environment does not provide a conducive environment for the holding of democratic elections. Nevertheless, if need be, ZESN and CSOs are ready and remain committed to monitor the process and advocate for minimum conditions before the Referendum and next elections through effective coordinated interventions.

ORGANISATIONS IN ATTENDANCE

1. Achieve Your Goal Trust
2. Bulawayo Agenda
3. Bulawayo People Residents Association
4. Civic Education Trust Network
5. Christian Alliance
6. Combined Harare Residents Association
7. Centre for Community Development in Zimbabwe
8. Centre for Research and Development
9. Crisis Coalition in Zimbabwe
10. Centre for Peace Initiatives in Africa
11. Counseling Services Unit
12. Elections Resource Centre
13. Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe
14. Habakkuk Trust
15. Heal Zimbabwe
16. Human Rights Development Trust in Southern Africa
17. Law Society of Zimbabwe

18. Kubatana
19. Matabeleland Constitution Reform Agenda
20. National Association of Non - Governmental Organisations
21. Media Centre
22. Media Institute for Southern Africa
23. Media Monitoring Project of Zimbabwe
24. National Association for the Care of the Handicapped
25. National Constitutional Assembly
26. Public Affairs Parliamentary Support Trust
27. Progressive Teachers Association Zimbabwe
28. Research and Advocacy Unit
29. Restoration of Human Rights
30. Radio Dialogue
31. Rooftop Promotions
32. SAYWHAT
33. Southern African Parliamentary Support Trust
34. Transparency International - Zimbabwe
35. VERITAS
36. Women's Coalition - Zimbabwe
37. Women of Zimbabwe Arise
38. Women's Trust
39. Youth Agenda
40. Youth Initiative for Democracy in Zimbabwe
41. Youth Empowerment and Transformation
42. Zimbabwe Association of Doctors for Human Rights
43. Zimbabwe Association of Crime Prevention and Rehabilitation of the Offender
44. Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions
45. Zimbabwe Council of Churches
46. Zimbabwe Coalition on Debt and Development
47. Zimbabwe Civic Education Trust
48. Zimbabwe Election Support Network
49. Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Right Association
50. Zimbabwe Peace Project
51. Zimbabwe Students Christian Movement
52. Zimbabwe Women Lawyers Association
53. Zimbabwe Youth Network
54. Members of the Academia (University of Zimbabwe)
55. Resource persons from Kenya

Promoting Democratic Elections in Zimbabwe

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NOTES

¹Addressing a public meeting in Bulawayo, Friday 12 November 2010. As quoted in The Daily News.

²The Zimbabwe Independent, 21 Oct. 2010.

³"Civic groups powerless to stop violent election", SW RadioAfrica 1 November 2010.

⁴Even though the Zimbabwean dollar in February 2009 was substituted as legal tender by five foreign currencies, i.e. US Dollar, Euro, British Pound, Botswana Pula and South African Rand, prices and wages are in general settled in dollar, and "dollarisation" is consequently the popular term used.

⁵International Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°70, 3 March 2010: Zimbabwe: Political and Security Challenges to the Transition

⁶Further members of JOC are reportedly: General Constantine Chiwenga - Commander of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces, Lieutenant-General Philip Sibanda - Commander of the Zimbabwe National Army, Air Marshal Perence Shiri - Commander of the Air Force of Zimbabwe, Commissioner Augustine Chihuri - Commissioner of the Zimbabwe Republic Police, Major General (Ret.) Paradzayi Zimondi - Head of the Zimbabwe prison service, Happyton Bonyongwe - Director-General of the Central Intelligence Organisation, Gideon Gono - Governor of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe.

⁷For a comprehensive list of EU sanctions, see: http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/cfsp/sanctions/docs/measures_en.pdf

⁸For an overview of US sanctions, see: <http://www.ustras.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/programs/zimbabwe/zimb.shtml>

⁹The percentages of votes given were: Morgan Tsvangirai 47, 9 - Robert Mugabe 43,2 - Simba Makoni 8,3.

¹⁰For this report, the term "Inclusive Government" (IG) is used to describe the government formed in February 2009 between MDC-T, Zanu-PF and MDC-M - rather than terms used by other authors such as "Government of National Unity" or "Power-Sharing Agreement". IG is the term used in the GPA and in addition, there never were neither 'unity' nor any 'power-sharing' (rather a division of powers) in the IG.

¹¹International Monetary Fund: World Economic Outlook. Washington, October 2010.

¹²Statement by Finance Minister Tendai Biti, Oct. 24, 2010.

¹³It is estimated that app. 3 million Zimbabweans, a quarter of the population have left, mainly to South Africa and UK.

¹⁴Zimonline, 17 September 2010.

¹⁵This draft constitution was written by The Negotiators during secret talks held in September 2007. It first came to the public's knowledge in September 2008 as Annexure B to the GPA and is mentioned in this as to be "recognised". It was immediately rejected by leading civil society organisations for two reasons; firstly, it was lacking in democratic control with the executive and other institutions, traditionally utilized by Zanu-PF to exert totalitarian control and secondly, and more importantly, it ran contrary to Zimbabwean Civil Society's decade-long demands of a 'people-driven' CMP, whereby a new constitution was based upon thorough consultation with the populace. MDC quickly supported this rejection, claiming the draft had only served as an interim measure to guide the elections in 2008, and fully backed the CMP described in the GPA as constituting a 'people-driven' process. This was rejected by The National Constitutional Assembly, the leading umbrella organisation originally embracing MDC, who claimed that a process driven by a parliamentary committee would be 'politician' and not 'people' driven.

¹⁶On Aug. 29, 2009, The Zimbabwe Independent newspaper quoted a report tabled in the Zanu-PF politburo by acting commissar Sikhanyiso Ndlovu revealing that the party had no solid structures throughout the country and that it would not win future polls.

¹⁷Vice-President Joice Mujuru in October, months before the eventual constitution had been drafted, urged people to vote 'yes' in the coming referendum. Radio VOP 24 October 2010 plus interviews with involved officials.

¹⁸It is a irony that Zanu-PF in this way seem to have re-conquered lost ground utilising a process almost entirely funded by its declared Western arch-enemies. The outreach meetings of the CMP was funded by Australia, Denmark, EU, France, Holland, UK, UNDP and USA.

¹⁹Higher and Tertiary Education Minister and Politburo member, long-time Minister of Foreign Affairs Stan Mudenge, in a meeting in his constituency in May 2010 said that his Zanu (PF) party was the one ruling while the inclusive government was just administrative: "The set-up of the inclusive government does not mean that we surrendered power to MDC-T. Zanu (PF) is still in control, and will remain in control of the country's affairs. The inclusive government is mainly concerned with administration of government duties than power sharing." Mudenge added that his party would never hand real power to Tsvangirai. Radio VOP, 6 May 2010.

²⁰Interview.

²¹For recent reports, see: http://www.globalwitness.org/media_library_detail.php/993/en/return_of_the_blood_diamond_how_the_crisis_in_zimb and <http://www.pacweb.org/index-e.php>

²²The country's most reliable political polls are conducted by the Mass Public Opinion Institute. Since the formation of the IG, its pollers have been able to penetrate hitherto inaccessible parts of the country and polls can generally be considered reflecting reality. Two trends have emerged since the first of such polls: Firstly, support for MDC has steadily fallen, from 55-57 per cent during March-September 2009 over 49 per cent in November 2009 to 32 per cent in August 2010. Secondly, the number of people declining to answer questions about their political preference rose, especially following the initiation of Zanu-PF's CMP campaign, from 22-25 per cent to 40 per cent, spreading from the rural areas to also include peri-urban and urban areas.

²³Tsvangirai after his 6 Oct. statement wrote the European Union, Italy, South Africa, Sweden and the United Nations not to recognize ambassadors he said were unconstitutionally, unilaterally appointed by President Robert Mugabe in July. This he reportedly did in spite of Western diplomats warning him of such a step. As of mid- November none had heeded the call from Tsvangirai

²⁴Speaking at Mabvuku Hall, Harare, Oct. 19, 2010, at the kick-off of his national tour. Quoted in numerous sources, for instance The Daily News, Oct. 21, 2010.

²⁵"Nobody should ever dream of replacing liberation movements as the governing parties in Southern Africa, Zanu-PF national chairman Cde Simon Khaya Moyo has said. Addressing a Zanu-PF national co-ordination committee meeting ..., Cde Khaya Moyo said: "No liberation movement will ever be replaced by people coming from nowhere. This applies to Zanu-PF in Zimbabwe, ANC in South Africa, Frelimo in Mozambique, Swapo in Namibia, MPLA in Angola and Chama Cha Mapinduzi in Tanzania." The Herald, 22.10.2010.

²⁶SWRadio, 16 September 2010

²⁷Source: The Cato Institute, <http://www.cato.org/zimbabwe>

²⁸Brian Macgarry: Dollarisation: Its immediate impact, how did we survive. Paper published by The Zimbabwean, 27 Sept. 2010.

²⁹A note of caution on figures circulating on the Unemployment Rate in Zimbabwe: This is often cited as being 94 per cent, but this is a faulty figure based on UN figures for the proportion of the population formally employed (in 2008: 6 per cent). Firstly, a very large proportion of the population is below employment age and secondly, another large proportion of the adult population is fully employed as small-scale farmers. For this reason this report shies away from stating unemployment rates but prefers rather to compare number of people formally employed.

³⁰No pay rise for Zimbabwe civil servants. RadioVOP, 4 October 2001

³¹IMF Country Report No. 10/186, July 2010

³²EIU Country Report, 1 October 2010.

³³EIU Country Report, 1 October 2010

³⁴The Herald, Oct. 25, 2010

³⁵Interview with Finance Minister Tendai Biti

³⁶Sunday Mail 10 Oct, 2010

³⁷The Herald, Oct. 25, 2010

³⁸EIU Country Report, 1 October 2010

³⁹Interview.

⁴⁰Source: Zimbabwe Tobacco Association, Oct. 2010.

⁴¹This too, is a result of politics, as explained by the second vice-president of the Zimbabwe Farmers's Union, Berean Mukwende: "As a union, we went to District Development Fund to find out what happened to the combine harvesters and we were told they were given to certain individuals. We asked to be given the names of the beneficiaries, but they did not have a list." The Standard, Oct. 13, 2010

⁴²Same

⁴³Speculation on the President's health has long been a favorite sport amongst Zimbabweans, not least since a great proportion is convinced that no meaningful change can happen as long as he is at the helm of the country. Numerous stories are told of his use of ngangas and East Asian medical specialists to stay active. He does appear his age, but can perform as a sparkingly clear and charismatic speaker. When asked about his health in a rare interview, he jokingly told Reuters' in September 2010 that "I don't know how many times I die but nobody has ever talked about my resurrection. I suppose they don't want to, because it would mean they would mention my resurrection several times and that would be quite divine, an achievement for an individual who is not divine. Jesus died once, and resurrected only once, and poor Mugabe several times," he said, clapping his hands loudly, laughing and rocking in his chair.' Reuters 9 Sept. 2010. This interview came hard on the heels of tv-footage showing him not being able to descend the stairs from an airplane in China without substantial assistance, the first factual public evidence that all might not be quite well.

⁴⁴For a detailed description of this see International Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°70, 3 March 2010: Zimbabwe: Political and Security Challenges to the Transition

⁴⁵ICG Africa Briefing N°70

⁴⁶Recently several well-respected observers have suggested this could be the discreet, almost reclusive but very capable Sydney Sekeramayi. He belongs to the same influential Zezuru Shona clan as Mugabe and as a loyal party member since the early 1960'ies his credentials are impeccable. He has never openly displayed any presidential ambitions and belongs to the Presidents most trusted inner circle. In addition, with very little obvious blood on his hands he can be deemed presentable to voters and the outside world.

⁴⁷Meeting held in Cyril Jennings Hall, Highfield, Harare, Tuesday 26 Oct 2010. RadioVOP, 28 Oct. 2010.

⁴⁸Less attention has been given to the fact that the Act in addition reserve a large number of business areas for blacks (or "indigenous peoples" as is the term used in the Act) such as all agricultural production of food and cash crops, transport (buses, taxis and car hire services), retail and wholesale trade, barber shops, hairdressing and beauty salons, employment agencies, estate agencies, valet services, grain milling, bakeries, tobacco grading and packaging, tobacco processing, advertising agencies, milk processing and provision of local arts.

⁴⁹Three weeks after the secret gazetting, Mugabe told hundreds of supporters at his 86th birthday celebrations in Bulawayo that the indigenisation policy, like the land reform programme, was meant to correct historical imbalances in the ownership of the country's resources: "This policy is not meant to nationalise companies but to broaden ownership of our resources. Yesterday, we were down trodden, there was slavery... Back home, the people were colonised and turned into slave and semi-slave to do work for masters who had colonised us. It was slavery in the colonies and that is what created the imbalances."

⁵⁰In a statement 5 November 2010 MDC-T publicly charged that ZANU-PF has loaded the secretariat staff with members of the Central Intelligence Organization, the military and the national police.

⁵¹In september, ZEC chairman Judge Simpson Mutambanengwe stated that: "commissioners were appointed on the 31 of March 2010 ... but they still not have received their conditions of service ... Conditions of service for the secretariat staff are poor and not in line with the conditions of other election management bodies in the region." Zimonline, 18 September.

⁵²Mutambanengwe on 4 November reiterated that without an immediate injection of funds his commission will not be able to carry out reforms key to ensuring that polls expected 2011 are credible. Zimonline 5 November 2010.

⁵³Like any other higher-ranking government officials, most of these are Zanu-PF members.

⁵⁴The Zimbabwe Independent newspaper in May 2010 reported that Mutambara managed to have the non-invited Mugabe speak at a World Economic Forum summit in Dar Es Salaam which Mugabe happened visit for another event. According to the paper's report Mutambara, who is a member of WEF, enabled Mugabe to 'gatecrash' the Forum. Zimbabwe Independent, 14 May 2010.

⁵⁵Opinion polls repeatedly measure voter backing to be app. 1 per cent.

⁵⁶The management committee consists of Copac's three co-chairman (Paul Munyaradzi Mangwana (Zanu-PF), Edward Mkhosi (MDC-M) Douglas Mwonzora (MDC-T), The Minister of Constitutional and Parliamentary Affairs (Eric Matinenga, MDC-T) plus the six so-called Negotiators (as they negotiated the NGA), from Zanu-PF: Patrick Chinamasa and Nicholas Goche, from MDC-T Tendai Biti and Elton Mangoma, from MDC-M: Welshman Ncube and Priscilla Misihairabwi-Mushonga.

⁵⁷SWRadio, 21 October 2010.

⁵⁸Both quotes by Ncube in RadioVOP: "Welshman Ncube Blasts Zanu (PF) And MDC", 20 Oct. 2010.

⁵⁹An audit of the existing voters' roll conducted by pressure group Sokwanele unearthed several anomalies in the current roll maintained by the Registrar General's Office. These included a surprisingly large number of people aged 100 and above. The audit identified names of 74 021 voters aged above 100 on the roll used in last year's harmonised parliamentary and presidential elections. There were also 82 456 people registered who are aged between 90 and 100 years old. The Zimbabwean, 24 July 2010.

⁶⁰Zimonline, 05 November 2010

⁶¹According to the Constitution as amended by the GPA the President can dissolve Parliament and call an election only in agreement with PM Tsvangirai.

⁶²According to the Zimbabwe Independent, "an extra-ordinary politburo meeting on Wednesday was shocked after political commissar Webster Shamu revealed that grassroots structures were in a mess. Sources who attended the meeting said Shamu told the politburo that Zanu PF was not ready for elections considering the troubled structures that were destroyed by factionalism. But President Robert Mugabe instructed Shamu to put the party structures in order as a matter of urgency. "It seems the politburo doesn't have a common view over elections," one politburo member said. "Some members might not be open to challenge what Mugabe say, but we know that all Zanu PF senior officials don't want elections." The Independent, 04 November 2010.

⁶³SW Radio, 28 October, 2010

⁶⁴In its item on this issue SW Radio 29 October 2010 reported the seizure of such radios from villagers in Murehwa and the confiscation in September from a local NGO in Gweru of 862 similar radios.

⁶⁵The party might be warming up to this through statements in early November that the forthcoming Zanu-PF "Peoples Congress" in December will decide on whether Zanu-PF will remain in the IG.

⁶⁶Appendix A.

⁶⁷"Civic groups powerless to stop violent election", SWradioafrica 1 November 2010

⁶⁸Zimonline, 08 November 2010

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